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INTRODUCTION

A functional claiming' phobia has long gripped U.S. patent

jurisprudence. It is manifested doctrinally in decisions holding that
functional expressions in patent claims are either so abstract,
indefinite, or overbroad 2 as to frustrate the patent law's Constitutional
mandate to promote the progress of useful arts. 3 Its roots run deep, to
early nineteenth century patent decisions. 4 Today, it is manifested in
the patent statute, at 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 [hereinafter § 112,
1.
"Functional" patent claims, or, more precisely, "functional" expressions appearing in
claims, describe subject matter in terms of what that subject matter does (its function) rather
than what it is. A commonplace functional claiming format employs the generic term "means"
followed by a functional statement, and accordingly is denominated "means plus function"
format. For example, in means-plus-function format, a nail might be claimed, functionally, as
"means for attaching." Similarly, a collection of circuit components in a complicated electrical
schematic (or a collection of complex software routines) might be claimed together functionally
as, say, "means for calculating."
Early literature developed the notion of a functional claiming doctrine under which
claims deemed functional might be held invalid or construed narrowly. For a characteristic
articulation of the functional claiming doctrine, see, for example, L. T. Phelan, Functionalityin
Claims, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 833, 834 (1949) ("[A] claim is invalid for 'functionality' when
in terms, or practical effect, it comprehends all solutions of the problem involved rather than the
particular solution, or solutions, including equivalents, discovered or invented by the
patentee."). Deller devoted an entire treatise chapter to the functional claiming doctrine. See
ANTHONY W. DELLER, I PATENT CLAIMS Ch. 16 (2d ed. 1971).
2.
In theory, each of these three terms invokes distinct objections to patentability. In
the history of the functional claiming doctrine, the distinctions have often become muddied. See
infra Part II for a characterization of the early case law with reference to abstractness,
indefiniteness, and overbreadth. See infra Part VI for a reflection on the consequences of
intermingling these objections and implications for reform proposals.
3.
That mandate appears in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4.
A famous early example is Joseph Story's opinion in Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723
(C.C.D. Mass. 1840). As Story summarized the issue:
The specification states: 'It is claimed, as new, to cut ice of a uniform size, by
means of an apparatus worked by any other power than human. The invention of
this art, as well as the particular method of the application of the principle, are
claimed by the subscriber' (Wyeth). It is plain, then, that here the patentee
claims an exclusive title to the art of cutting ice by means of any power, other
than human power. Such a claim is utterly unmaintainable in point of law. It is a
claim for an art or principle in the abstract, and not for any particular method or
machinery, by which ice is to be cut. No man can have a right to cut ice by all
means or methods, or by all or any sort of apparatus, although he is not the
inventor of any or all of such means, methods, or apparatus.
Id. at 727. Interestingly, Story proceeded to apply a narrowing construction to save the claim:
It appears to me, that the language of the summary may be, and indeed ought to
be construed... to mean by the words 'the particular method of the application,'
the particular apparatus and machinery described in the specification to effect the
purpose of cutting ice.
Id. at 727-28.
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6], which authorizes the use of certain types of functional
expressions, but subjects them to a potentially severe restriction in
scope: the expression covers only the corresponding structure,
5
material, or acts disclosed in the patent, plus "equivalents" thereof.

This Paper reflects on the fear and loathing of functional claims,
and proposes a variety of reforms. Part II reexamines the functional
claiming doctrine as it existed prior to the enactment of § 112, 6.
This historical synthesis demonstrates that § 112, 6's structure-plusequivalents restriction derives predominantly from pre-1952

conceptions of how the patent law should deal with claim

6
indefiniteness and claim scope problems.
The remainder of the Paper applies the lessons learned from the
historical synthesis to the formulation of a two-track reform proposal.
Parts IH-V of the paper propose specific reforms to the existing § 112,
6 case law which can be implemented in the near term. 7 Part VI
proposes legislative reform (a longer term prospect) that eliminates
the § 112, 6 equivalency concept altogether on the grounds that it
responds to illusory problems of indefiniteness and overbreadth, using
a mechanism that no longer fits with the modem claim construction
regime.
The need for reform in § 112, 6 jurisprudence is especially

acute for several reasons.

First, as a practical matter, functional

expressions in "means-plus-function" format are appearing with
8
increasing frequency in the claims of litigated patents in recent years,
Specifically, § 112, 6 provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof,
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
In examining how the functional claiming doctrine has developed in response to
6.
claim scope problems, the Paper focuses particularly on elaborating on the link between § 112,
6 equivalency and the doctrine of equivalents as it was understood in the central claiming
regime. The Paper also focuses on the notion of undue claim breadth as an animating theme
underlying the functional claiming doctrine.
7.
The suggested reforms build on my previous work in this area. See Mark D. Janis,
Unmasking StructuralEquivalency: The Intersection of § 112, 6 Equivalents and the Doctrine
of Equivalents,4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205 (1994).
8.
See, e.g., William F. Lee & Eugene M. Paige, Means Plus and Step Plus Function
Claims: Do We Only Know Them When We See Them?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
251, 251 n.1 (1998) (reporting a substantial increase in the number of cases in which courts
refer to means-plus-function clauses).
The patent bar certainly has not reached any consensus as to the merits of means-plusfunction clauses. For the view that such clauses remain important to the draftsman, see, for
example, Gregory J. Maier & Bradley D. Lytle, The Strategic Use of Means-Plus-Function
5.
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and many of these cases involve assertions of § 112, 6 equivalency. 9
Claims drafted in means-plus-function are especially prevalent in
patents on software-related inventions, where the format has been
thought useful for complying with the subject matter eligibility
requirement.10
Second, courts applying § 112, 6 over the past four decades
have never carefully integrated the § 112, 6 equivalency concept

into the bipolar infringement regime,"I leaving § 112,

6 equivalency

to reside in a netherworld between literal and doctrine of equivalents
infringement. 12 As a result, means expressions are now subject to
bewildering case law under which § 112, 6 equivalents sometimes
Claims, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 241,244-46 (1998) (arguing that means clauses
are not inevitably narrower than clauses recited in structural format, and offering examples
suggesting that the question is context dependent); Paul E. Schaafsma, Functional Language's
DeathKnell is Exaggerated,20 NAT'LL. J. C41 (May 18, 1998).
9.
The apparent proliferation of means-plus-function language in U.S. patent claims
might testify to the power of such language as a claims drafting tool. But the rise in litigation
involving means-plus-function equivalency concepts could also be attributable to strategic
behavior gone astray, or even misinformation. Prior to Donaldson, patent prosecution
specialists who kept their distance from the courts encountered an environment in which meansplus-function clauses were read without regard for the limiting provisions of § 112, 6. See In
re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (describing PTO's practice); In
re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 548 (C.C.P.A. 1957) In re Lundberg was the principal authority
relied upon by the PTO for its pre-Donaldsonpractice. It seems quite possible that many claims
were drafted incorporating means-plus-function limitations with no real cognizance that the
language would be subjected to the strictures of § 112, 6 in litigation. Assertions of § 112, 6
equivalency is the most likely recourse in such situations, which may partially explain why such
assertions seem so prevalent today. See also Jeffrey N. Costakos & Walter E. Zimmerman, Do
Your Means Claims Mean What You Meant?, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 109, 111-12
(1997) (offering a similar explanation for the apparent "infatuation" of some patent lawyers with
means language).
10.
See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding
that the restrictive provisions of § 112, 6 save claims from objectionable abstractness because
they limit claims to a specific disclosed structure, and equivalents, by effectively importing
specific disclosed structure from the patent specification into the claim). Indeed, Professor
Toshiko Takenaka argues that U.S. software companies could suffer serious economic
consequences relative to their overseas competitors if U.S. courts maintain a highly restrictive
approach to functional claiming. See Toshiko Takenaka, Functional Claims: Discussions in
Comparative Law Perspective, Address at the Finnegan Lectures, Washington, D.C. (Sept.
1998) (copy on file with author).
11.
By the "bipolar" infringement regime, I mean the modem regime enunciated by the
Federal Circuit under which claims may be infringed either under a theory of literal
infringement (requiring exact literal correspondence between the elements of the claim and the
accused infringing device) or under a theory of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
See, e.g., Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
12.
Congress also deserves a share of the blame here for injecting an equivalency notion
into § 112, 6 without explaining the relationship between § 112, 6 and the modem
conceptions of the judicially developed doctrine of equivalents, enunciated only three years
earlier in GraverTank. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1949).
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borrow characteristics from the doctrine of equivalents and
sometimes do not. 13 The Federal Circuit's Dawn Equipment Co. v.
Kentucky Farms, Inc.14 decision dramatically illustrates the point. A
15
seemingly straightforward § 112, 6 case generated a panel opinion
16
and "additional views" from each of the three panel members,
reflecting widely divergent viewpoints on the fundamental issue of
6 equivalents to the doctrine of
the relationship of § 112,
equivalents. 17 Unfortunately, the § 112, 6 equivalency case law is
only subject to further complication in view of the upheaval over the
18
scope and meaning of "equivalents" in the doctrine of equivalents.
Finally, the need for reform of § 112, 6 is evident, albeit indirectly,
from the sudden emergence of a vexing and Byzantine threshold
scheme for determining whether an arguably functional expression in

fact qualifies as a "means plus function" expression subject to the
restrictive provisions of § 112,

6. The Federal Circuit has distracted

itself by creating an overly elaborate inquiry for determining whether
clauses that expressly recite the term "means" actually invoke § 112,

6.19

Worse still, the court has perhaps unwittingly opened the

13.
I deal with this issue in some detail in Part Ill. See infra Part III.
14. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014-17 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
15.
See id. at 1010, 1014-17.
16. See id. at 1018, 1022-23.
17.
See infra Parts 11-V for commentary on the Dawn Equipment decision and another
recent Federal Circuit decision dealing with the issue, Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v.
Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
18.
The conflicts are perhaps best encapsulated in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-19, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), rev'd sub nom
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
Part of this debate, of course, concerns the larger issue of the extent to which
equivalency is a question of fact subject to deferential review or a question of law subject to de
novo review. In recent years, the Federal Circuit has studiously avoided taking a position as to
where § 112, 6 equivalency lies on the law/fact spectrum. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (reserving expressly the
question of whether § 112, 6 equivalency is a question of law or fact), aff'd. 517 U.S. 370
(1996). See also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
bane) (indicating that a determination of the claimed function is a question of law but leaving
unresolved the proper characterization of the § 112, 6 equivalency determination).
The Federal Circuit currently applies a weak presumption that a claim clause that
. 19.
uses the term "means" intends to invoke the restrictive provisions of § 112, 6. See York
Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the
source of the so-called York presumption). See also Hester Indus. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472,
1483 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reciting the York presumption); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reciting the York presumption).
The York presumption seems a reasonable enough rule, but has not proven terribly
predictable in application. In York itself, the court concluded that a claim clause expressly
reciting the term "means" did not invoke § 112, 6, commenting that the presumption "does not
operate" where the claim merely recites the term "means" in a "predominantly" structural clause
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20
floodgates by declaring in Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc.
that clauses employing some functional recitations, without
employing "means" terminology, qualify for treatment under § 112,
6.21 If the court as a whole takes Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard,

that is not "sufficiently connected to a recited function." York, 99 F.3d at 1573-74 (construing
the claim language "means formed on the upwardly extending liner sidewall portions including
a plurality of spaced apart, vertically extending ridge members protruding from the liner
sidewall portions and forming load locks in gaps separating adjacent ones of the ridge members,
said load locks having a depth sufficient to anchor a structure positioned and supported in the
cargo bed").
Adding to the complexity, in Cole v. Kimberly-Clark; the court concluded that a claim
clause expressly reciting "means" did not invoke § 112, 6 because a true § 112, 6 clause
"must not recite a definite structure which performs the described function." Cole v. KimberlyClark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 530-31 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the claim language "perforation
means extending from the leg band means to the waist band means through the outer
impermeable layer means for tearing the outer impermeable layer means for removing the
training brief in case of an accident by the user").
The court reached a different result in a more recent case which likewise presented
arguments (although fairly weak ones) that the claim language in question recited "definite
structure" in the sense of Cole and failed to couple the recited "means" to a function in the sense
of York In Unidynamics v. Automatic Products Int'l, the court analyzed the claim language
"spring means tending to keep the door closed" as § 112, 6 language. Unidynamics Corp. v.
Automatic Prods. Int'l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The "tending" phrase expressed a
function sufficiently linked to the "means." Id. at 1318-19. Moreover, the presence of the term
"spring" was not disqualifying "definite structure" in the sense of Cole, because the claim in
Cole described not only "definite structure," but also "the location and extent of the structure."
Id. at 1322. Unidynamics seems to reach a palatable result, but its effort to distinguish Cole
seems entirely contrived and likely to lead to further confusion in the area as lower courts
attempt to determine the "extent" of structure that is necessary to oust claim language from
§ 112,16.
20.
Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1213-15 (Fed. Cir.1998).
The Federal Circuit's willingness to explore the applicability of § 112, 6 to
21.
functional expressions that did not expressly recite the "means" terminology first became
apparent in the Greenbergdecision, although the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) had previously agitated the issue in its post-Donaldson examination guidelines. See
Charles E. Van Horn, Means or Step Plus Function Limitation Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 6th
Paragraph,1162 OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 59, 59 (May 17,
1994). In Greenbergv. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, the court agreed with the proposition (advanced
in the PTO guidelines) that § 112, 6 could be triggered even in the absence of the term
"means," but determined that "it is fair to say that the use of the term 'means' (particularly as
used in the phrase 'means for') generally invokes section 112(6) and that the use of a different
formulation generally does not." Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the clause "cooperating detent mechanism defining the conjoint
rotation of said shafts in predetermined intervals" did not fall under § 112, 6).
In Mas-Hamilton, the court analyzed the following clause from claim 3 of the patentin-suit:
a substantially non-resilient lever moving element for moving the lever from its
disengaged position for engaging the protrusion of the lever with the cam surface
on the cam wheel so that the rotation of the cam wheel thereafter in the given
direction changes the locking mechanism from the locked condition to the
unlocked condition...
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Inc. seriously, vast numbers of patent claims could now be subjected
to the restrictive provisions of § 112,

6.22

This could contribute

dramatically to the tremendous upsurge in § 112, [6 equivalency
assertions.
II. FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING BEFORE HALLIBURTON:
A REASSESSMENT OF § 112, 1 6's ANCESTRY

Contemporary judicial and scholarly accounts generally portray
§ 112, 6 as the Congressional response to the Supreme Court's 1946
decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker
[hereinafter Halliburton].2 3 This conventional understanding of
Mas-Hamilton, 156 F.3d at 1213 (construing language from claim 3). The court also construed
the following language from claims 34 and 43: "a movable link member for holding the lever
out of engagement with the cam surface before entry of a combination and for releasing the
lever after entry of the combination .. " Id. at 1214.
The court convinced itself that the phrase "lever moving element" in claim 3 lacked
any particular meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art, and thus treated it as if it were a
generic "means" recitation. Id. at 1213-14. Because the remaining clauses were clearly
functional, the court concluded that § 112, 6 should apply. See id. at 1214. Similarly
perfunctory reasoning accompanied the court's conclusion that § 112, 6 should also apply to
the "movable link member" recitation in claims 34 and 43. Id. at 1215.
22.
A recent opinion of the Federal Circuit provides some reassurance that the court will
not blindly follow the lead of Mas-Hamilton. See Personalized Media Communications, LLC v.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 703-05 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In PersonalizedMedia, the court
considered whether a claim limitation reciting a "digital detector" coupled with functional
recitations invoked § 112, 6. Id. at 698 (supplying the text of the claims at issue, including
claim 6, which recited "a digital detector for receiving said transmission and detecting said
predetermined signal in said transmission based on either a specific location or a specific time").
The court applied the converse of the York presumption, asserting that the failure to recite
"means" gave rise to a presumption that § 112, 6 did not apply. Id. at 703-04 (citing MasHamilton). Proceeding, the court relied on rhetoric from Sage Products v. Devon Industries:
In deciding whether either presumption has been rebutted, the focus remains on
whether the claim as properly construed recites sufficiently definite structure to
avoid the ambit of § 112, 6.
Id. at 704 (citing Sage Prods., v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1427-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Applied here, the term "detector" assertedly had a well-known meaning in the art, and
sufficiently connoted structure to take the clause outside § 112, 6. Id. (concluding that
"'[d]etector' is not a generic structural term such as 'means,' 'element,' or 'device'; nor is it a
coined term lacking a clear meaning, such as 'widget' or 'ram-a-fram."'). It would certainly be
premature to characterize PersonalizedMedia as indicating a countertrend. Indeed, it may be
significant that the court did not repudiate Mas-Hamilton.
23.
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27 (espousing the conventional view of
§ 112, 6 as a response to Halliburton). In Halliburton,the Court construed a claim which
recited:
means associated with said pressure responsive device for tuning said receiving
means to the frequency of echoes from the tubing collars of said tubing sections
to clearly distinguish the echoes from said couplings from each other.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1946) (reciting the language
of claim 1). The Court struck down the claim as invalid on the basis that the clause in question
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§ 112, [6's origins may adequately illuminate § 112, 16's first
clause, because the Court in Halliburtonseemed to rule that the use of
a functional expression at the "point of novelty" 24 rendered a claim
invalid, while § 112, 6's first clause expressly authorizes the use of
means plus function (or step plus function) expressions in
combination claims without regard to the point of novelty. But the
portrayal of Halliburtonas the sole reference point for understanding
the restrictive "disclosure plus equivalents" rule of § 112, 6's
second clause is entirely unsatisfactory because it ignores decades of
pre-Halliburtoncase law.
A more rigorous historical synthesis of pre-1952 law on
functional claiming provides a number of important lessons for
First, the
modem consideration of § 112, [6 jurisprudence.
restrictive "disclosure plus equivalents" construction of functional
expressions currently embodied in § 112, 6 was well-established in
the law before 1952. Second, analysis of the pre-1952 "functional
claiming" law shows that the restrictive construction derives

principally from a pair of judicial strategies: (1) a strategy for
avoiding perceived invalidity and ineligibility problems; and (2) a
strategy for directly regulating claim scope, especially through
applying the doctrine of equivalents as it was understood in the
25
central claiming regime.

represented the "point of novelty" of the claimed invention, but failed adequately to describe the
physical structure of the invention. Id. at 8-9, 12-14.
Halliburtongave rise to a flurry of contemporaneous commentary, most of it critical.
See, e.g., Edward S. Irons, HalliburtonDecision Clarifieda 32 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 167 (1950);
Stuart Peterson, "Means" at the Exact Point of Novelty, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 195 (1949); L.
T. Phelan, The Issue of Infringement in Halliburton v. Walker, 31 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 187
(1949); M. A. Crews, Halliburtonv. WalkerBA Symposium, 31 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 176 (1949);
V.I. Richard, Does Halliburton v. Walker Make any Innovations, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 251
(1948); Carroll F. Palmer, Patent Claim Constructionand the Halliburton Oil Case, 29 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 515 (1947); E.C. Walsh, No More New Combinations?,29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 362
(1947); George Benjamin, Halliburton-Hullabaloo,29 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 304 (1947); Nathan
A. Conn, Halliburton v. Walker, 29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 289 (1947); Albert M. Zalkind,
HalliburtonOil Well Cementing Co. vs. Walker: A Technical Knockout, 29 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
105 (1947).
See generally infra Parts III and VI for more detailed discussion of various aspects of
the Halliburton decision.
See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for an explanation of the point of
24.
novelty concept as it operated in this context.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the central claiming
25.
regime.
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A. Pre-1952 Originsof the "DisclosurePlus Equivalents"
Restrictionon FunctionalClaims
Long before the Supreme Court took up Halliburton and
Congress enacted § 112, 6, a "disclosure plus equivalents" rule for
functional expressions was familiar in many circuits. For example, as
early as 1905, the Ninth Circuit was applying § 112, 6 principles to
means clauses:
Of course, an inventor cannot by the mere use of the word
'means,' in reference to the accomplishment of a designated
function in a combination claim, appropriate any and all kinds of
mechanism or devices which may perform the specified function,
or any other mechanism or device than that which is described in
the patent or which is its equivalent. Reference must be had to the
specifications to ascertain the means which are made an element of
26
the claim and are protected by the patent.
By 1908, these arguments reached the Supreme Court and were
greeted with apparent approval. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co.,27 the Court reviewed patent claims that
contained the expression "operating means for the forming plate,
adapted to cause the said plate to oscillate about its rear edge upon the
surface of the cylinder during the rotary movement of said
cylinder." 28 According to the alleged infringer's counsel, because the
claimed "operating means" did not expressly incorporate reference
characters from the specification, the Court was forced to choose
between two alternative interpretations. 29 First, the Court could refer
to "the descriptive part of the specification to ascertain what
'operating means' are meant, and then construe the claim as calling
for those 'operating means' or their equivalent." 30 Alternatively, the
Court could "ignore the descriptive part of the specification" and
"construe the claim as being satisfied by any 'operating means' which
can perform the particular function designated in the claim."'3 1 The
alleged infringer argued that the circuit court had erroneously
construed the claim in the latter fashion, and in doing so improperly

26.

American Can Co. v. Hickmott Asparagus Canning Co., 142 F. 141, 146 (9th Cir.

1905).
27.
28.
29.

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
Id. at 420.
Id.

30.

Id

31.

Id.
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32
gave the patentee in effect a patent on the function.
The Supreme Court disagreed, but unfortunately failed to speak
clearly on the legal question of which interpretation methodology was
proper. Instead, after admitting that the distinction between a patent
on a function and a patent on a "practically operative mechanism" is
difficult to draw with precision, 33 the Court refused to be engaged by
"abstractions" and upheld the lower court's determination that the
claim at issue was for a machine, not a function:
The claim is not for a function, but for mechanical means to bring
into working relation the folding plate and the cylinder. This
relation is the very essence of the invention, and marks the
advance upon the prior art. It is the thing that had never been done
before .... 34

Strictly speaking, this language seems to have left unresolved the
question of the legal regime governing construction of functional
expressions, but at the least it endorsed the use of functional
expressions (however they might end up being interpreted) in cases
where the true "invention" lay in the relationship between
35
components of the combination.
Perhaps set in motion by the apparent endorsement in
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the disclosed
structure plus equivalents construction of functional claims was
widely adopted before Halliburton.36 Indeed, by 1937, the Eighth
32.
Id at 421.
The Court cited a passage from Professor Robinson's treatise that was routinely cited
33.
in early judicial opinions on the subject. Continental Paper,210 U.S. at 422, citing 1 WILLIAM
C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 144 et seq. (1890).
34.
Id.
35.
Drawn in this narrow fashion, the Court left open the question of whether functional
expressions could be used at the "point of novelty," - i.e., in cases in which the true
"invention" could be isolated in a single expressed claim element rather than in the combination
of elements. Later courts, most notably the Supreme Court in Halliburton, exploited this
possibility. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (describing the point of novelty rule
and its use in Halliburton).
See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. Nivison-Weiskopf Co., 58 F.2d 701, 705 (6th Cir.
36.
1932) (construing without comment a claim which apparently included a means clause as
limited to "the mechanical equivalents of the means disclosed in the patent specifications"). See
also Doble Eng'g Co. v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 134 F.2d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1943) (reporting lower
court's analysis in which a claim was limited to cover "the Doble structure and its equivalents,"
but not "all means for accomplishing the same result"); Moore v. Frigidaire Corp., 71 F.2d 840,
843 (8th Cir. 1934) (noting the alleged infringer's argument that the claim at issue "did not
cover anything more than those [disclosed] means or their substantial equivalents"); Rubenstein
v. Slobotkin, 33 F.2d 603, 608 (E.D. N.Y. 1929) ("The expression 'means' can only cover the
specific thing shown in the description and drawing, together with a fair range of equivalents.");
Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co. v. Dean Electric Co., 182 F. 991, 1003 (6th Cir. 1910)
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Circuit took it as a matter of "well-settled authority" that:
[a]n inventor cannot by the mere use of the word 'means'
appropriate any and all kinds of mechanism or devices which may
perform the specified function, or any other mechanism or device
than that which is described in the patent or which is its
37
mechanical equivalent.
Likewise, at least some scholars assumed that functional
expressions would be limited in scope to the disclosure plus
equivalents:
The patentee would not be bequeathed with an all inclusive
monopoly, for a prescribed means or mechanism for
accomplishing a desired end would still be limited to the particular
means described in the specification, or their clear mechanical
equivalents, and would not cover any other mechanical structure
which is substantially different in its construction or in its
38
operation.
Of course, the observations that a functional claiming doctrine
pre-existed Halliburton, and was partially codified in § 112, 6's
second clause, raise further, more fundamental questions about what
it was, exactly, that Congress codified. This, as detailed below, is a
complicated undertaking.
B. The Disclosure-Plus-EquivalentsRestriction as a Strategy
for Addressing Indefiniteness and Ineligibility Concerns
A common early objection to functional claim language was that
a claim element purporting to encompass any means for performing a
stated function was either invalid or recited ineligible subject matter.
As for invalidity, some courts held that claims containing unbridled 39
functional expressions were likely to be fatally indefinite. 40 For
example, the Sixth Circuit in Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick
Manufacturing Co. invoked indefiniteness:
(construing a means clause as being limited to the circuit component disclosed in the
specification).
37.
Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon Form Lathe Co., 87 F.2d 390, 392 (8th Cir. 1937).
38.
See Peterson, supra note 23, at 207 (arguing that Halliburton did not upset the
prevailing general rule authorizing the use of means expressions in combination claims, but
instead merely carved out an exception where means expressions were employed at the mythical
"exact point of novelty").
39.
By "unbridled" or "unrestricted" I mean construing a means expression to
encompass all means for performing the recited function.
40. The then-governing statutory provision for indefiniteness, R.S. 4888, was a
predecessor to today's § 112, 2. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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It has often been stated that an element described in such general
terms as to include every form of the element or device then
known is sufficient [sic, insufficient] except when the generic
description can properly be interpreted to mean the particular form
of the element set forth in the specifications. This necessarily
follows from proper application of section 4888 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended (35 U.S.C.A. § 33), which provides that the
applicant for a patent shall file in the patent office a written
description of the same, and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, compounding, and using it, in full, clear, concise, and
exact terms, and that he shall particularly point out and distinctly
claim the part, improvement,
or combination which he claims as
41
his invention or discovery.
Likewise, the First Circuit declared that
The functional claims doctrine stems from the statutory
requirement of long standing that an applicant for a patent must
particularly point out and distinctly claim what he regards as his
invention. See R.S. § 4888, 35 U.S.C. § 33, and now Title 35
U.S.C. § 112. This requirement, the courts have repeatedly held,
prevents a patentee from stating his invention in terms of the result
he achieves instead of in terms of his method of achievement. 42
43
Similar rhetoric can be found in opinions from other circuits.
41.
Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Mfg., 73 F.2d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom
Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R.M. Hollingshead Co., 298 U.S. 415 (1936). (construing the expression
"means co-acting with the ends of said pin for detachably connecting the discharge end of said
conduit with said grease cup"). Theappellate court declared in apparent frustration that owing
to the "all inclusive generality and baffling obscurity of this element," only by referring "to the
drawings and specifications" could the court accord the expression "any specific meaning."
Hollingshead,73 F.2d at 546.
42.
S.D. Warren Co. v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co., 205 F.2d 602, 605 (1st
Cir. 1953).
43.
For example, construing a claim that recited "means for lifting the stopping means to
release the bails stopped by it," the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found it necessary to
"turn to the specifications" to preserve the claim against indefiniteness: "[i]f the words are
construed to include every method of accomplishing the result, the claim is invalid for
indefiniteness and uncertainty. A claim, alone or in light of the specifications, must describe a
concrete apparatus, not an abstract function." Callison v. Pickens, 77 F.2d 62, 64 (10th Cir.
1935). See also Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co. v. Turchan, 208 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1953)
("The word 'means' is itself an indefinite statement and as such must be interpreted in the light
of the patent drawings and specifications."). See also DELLER, supra note 1, at § 292, at 814
(observing that functional expressions are frequently attacked as indefinite).
Halliburtonitself purports to be an example of the use of an indefiniteness rationale to
strike down a claim containing a functional expression. However, the Court's opinion wanders
off track in so many respects that it is dangerous to characterize the case as a true application of
an indefiniteness rationale. See infra notes 219-224 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Court's opinion draws upon undue breadth notions). Even in articulating the question before it,
the Halliburton Court went astray. The Court thought that it needed to decide whether the
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Other courts couched their analyses in terms that, at least to
modem observers, tend more towards the rhetoric of patent-eligible
subject matter.44 That is, courts might hold that a means expression

purporting to cover all means for accomplishing the stated function
constituted a claim to an abstraction, thus lying outside the scope of

eligible subject matter.45 A Supreme Court decision that created

momentum for this line of cases is Coming v. Burden,46 in which the
Court limited a patent to the disclosed machine for making "puddler's

balls," rejecting a broader construction that would have extended the
patent to other machines performing essentially the same process, on
the ground that the broader construction would give the patentee
exclusive rights in a function, in the abstract. 47 The traditional
claims at issue "failed to make the 'full, clear, concise, and exact' description of the alleged
invention required by Rev.Stat. § 4888, 35 U.S.C. § 33 .... " Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 2 (1946). The statute, however, provided that this was the role of the
written description portion of the specification; the claims needed merely to "particularly point
out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which [the inventor] claims as
his invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1946). Presumably the Halliburton Court would
have struck down the claims anyway even if it had applied the correct statutory standard.
44. The current statutory basis for limitations on patent eligible subject matter is 35
U.S.C. § 101, which provides that patent-eligible subject matter includes any "new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof .... " 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
45.
See, e.g., Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, The Rosetta Stone for the
Doctrine of Means-Plus-FunctionClaims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 245-48
(1997) (collecting cases).
46.
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 269 (1853) (noting a patentee "cannot describe a
machine which will perform a certain function, and then claim the function itself, and all other
machines that may be invented to perform the same function" without risking invalidity).
Another early Supreme Court pronouncement on point appears in Fullerv. Yentzer.
Patents for a machine will not be sustained if the claim is for a result, the
established rule being that the invention, if any, within the meaning of the Patent
Act, consists in the means or apparatus by which the result is obtained, and not
merely in the mode of operation, independent of the mechanical devices
employed; nor will a patent be held valid for a principle or for an idea, or any
other mere abstraction.
Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U.S. 288, 288 (1876), citing Burr v. Duryee, I Wall. 513 (1863).
47.
The celebrated invalidation of claim 8 in O'Reilly v. Morse is perhaps another
example. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1863). Claim 8 of Morse's patent read as follows:
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of
machinery, described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or
printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new
application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discovered.
li at 86. Of course, O'Reilly v. Morse can also be viewed as a case about undue
breadth. For the observation that the functional claiming cases sound a common theme of
concern over undue breadth, and the modem significance of that observation, see infra notes
218-235 and accompanying text.
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reluctance to uphold claims in which the sole recited element is a
functional expression (often referred to as a "single means" claim)
may also derive from concerns about statutory subject matter.4 8
Typically, courts did not draw any sharp distinction between the
eligibility and indefiniteness rationales. 4 9 Unfortunately, this lack of
precision was rather commonplace in decisions invoking the
functional claiming doctrine.
Given the functional claiming doctrine, as elaborated in some
courts, sprang from invalidity or ineligibility doctrines, the
consequences of a functional claiming designation could be severe.
In some instances, indefiniteness or eligibility concerns lead to the
outright invalidation of claims. For example, in Heidbrink v.
McKesson, the Sixth Circuit invoked O'Reilly v. Morse in
invalidating functional claims:
We are compelled to think that [the claims at issue] are invalid
because functional. They are apparently most deliberately and
skillfully drafted to cover any means which any one ever may
discover of producing the result; that is, to accomplish the one
thing while avoiding the other. We think they are clearly to be
condemned under the rule stated in O'Reilly v. Morse ....

and that

they are not within the principle of the Telephone Case ...

.50

However, very few courts, if any, viewed invalidity as the
inevitable consequence of a determination that a claim was
functional. Some courts, even while invalidating the claims before
them, acknowledged the possibility of saving a functional claim
though a "narrowed" construction. 5 1 That is, the functional claiming
48.
For a brief summary of early cases and commentary regarding the proscription
against single means claims, see, e.g., DELLER, supra note 1, at § 240, at 700. The proscription
was incorporated into § 112, 6, which by its express language authorizes means-plus-function
terminology only for claims to "combinations." See also Hofmann & Heller, supra note 45, at
260-61 (briefly explaining the notion of a single means claim).
49.
For example, in one case, the Ninth Circuit seemed to invoke both rationales in the
same breath:
To permit a patentee to burden his claims by the use of indefinite language would
lead to supporting him in a monopoly of a principle or result, which would bar
other inventors from arriving at the same result by different means.
Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 255 F. 769, 779 (9th Cir. 1919).
50.
Heidbrink v. McKesson, 290 F. 665, 668-69 (6th Cir. 1923). See also Tokheim Oil
Tank & Pump Co. v. Dean, 73 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1934) (concluding that the means
expression at issue "describe[s] nothing but functions, and a function is not patentable"); Tyden
v. Ohio Table Co., 152 F. 183, 185 (6th Cir. 1907) (invalidating a claim that contained means
expressions because it claimed all means for carrying out the recited function, and therefore was
"substantially a claim for a function").
51.
See, e.g., Heidbrink, 290 F. at 668-69; Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. v. Turchan,
208 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1953); Henry, 255 F. at 779.
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doctrine as articulated in these cases derived from a judicial strategy
to avoid invalidating claims by imposing a restrictive claim
interpretation, thus "interpreting" around the invalidity/ineligibility
52
problem.
Similarly, a number of courts invalidated functional claims only
where the functional expression appeared at the so-called "point of
novelty." An early example of the point of novelty qualification to
the functional claiming doctrine appears in Davis Sewing Machine
Co. v. New Departure Manufacturing Co. 5 3 Rejecting an argument
that claims should be invalidated as "functional" whenever the term
"means" or the like appeared anywhere in the claim, the court ruled
that functional expressions would endanger a claim only when they
were used at the exact "point of novelty," and even in this event, the
claim could be saved by construing the functional expression
narrowly:
[W]here used with reference to the exact point of novelty, 'means'
or 'mechanism' may expose the claim to attack on the ground that
it is functional; in that respect, each case will present a problem by
itself. But where used with reference to the make-up of the field
for which the real invention finds its usefulness or with reference
to the connecting parts which permit the salient novelty of the
invention to accomplish its function, these words are only a
convenient formula of the broadest equivalency of which the real
invention permits. Their use amounts to a statement by the
inventor that, as to this element, the claim is not confined to the
form shown, nor to any close imitation of that form, but extends as
broadly as is consistent with the extent of his inventive step to all
forms accomplishing that part of the ultimate, composite result,
and, of course, does not, of itself, prevent the court (where the
state of the recordrequires)from interpretingthe claim as limited
to a more or less close approximation to the 'means' described in
54
the specification.
52.
It is important to recognize that modem courts would have great difficulty justifying
a similar analytic approach - that is, one in which the court departed from the claim language
in the name of "interpreting" the claim around an invalidity problem. The then-existing claim
construction regime allowed courts much wider latitude to depart from the language of the
claims in the name of "interpretation." Certainly, the overarching concept of central claiming
supported such departures. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (explaining the central
claiming theory in connection with the doctrine of equivalents).
Additionally, courts may also have believed that they were simply applying the patent
law canon that the claims will be "interpreted" narrowly if necessary to preserve their validity.
See, e.g., DELLER, supranote 1, at § 90, at 182-83 (reciting the canon).
53.
Davis Sewing Mach. v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 217 F. 775 (6th Cir. 1914).
54. Id. at 782-83 (emphasis supplied).
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Citing Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. New Departure
Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court articulated a point of novelty
analysis for functional claims in General Electric Co. v. Wabash
55
Appliance Corp:
[T]he vice of a functional claim exists not only when a claim is
'wholly' functional, if that is ever true, but also when the inventor
is painstaking when he recites what has already been seen, and
then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point of
56
novelty.
Halliburtonwas, perhaps, so startling because it departed rather
radically from this general trend of referring to the possibility of
claim invalidation but then crafted a narrowed construction to save
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938). The claims at
55.
issue did not employ means plus function terminology, but used other functional clauses to
characterize the claimed product. One of the claims at issue read:
A drawn filament for electric incandescent lamps or other devices, composed
substantially of tungsten and made up mainly of a number of comparatively large
grains of such size and contour as to prevent substantial sagging and offsetting
during a normal or commercially useful life for such a lamp or other device.
Id. at 368.
56. Id. at 371. In other cases, courts achieved the same result, but spoke in terms of
limiting the claims to the inventor's "true conception," or the "essence of the invention," to
justify the narrowed construction. A case from the Seventh Circuit is representative:
[Niothing is clearer in patent law than that patents are not granted on results, but
for the means whereby such results are obtained. Yet, it sometimes is necessary
to study the results of an operation in order to ascertain the limitations, and
co-acting characteristics, of the elements in the combination- in short, to better
construe the language of the claims. Had Benoit's claims so limited his means to
describe the particular machine which represented his mental conception, we
think no difficulty would have arisen over this question of infringement.., we
agree with the district court that if validity of the claim is to be recognized the
claim must be limited by, and to, the disclosures appearing in the specifications
and drawings.
Benoit v. Wadley Co., 54 F.2d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 1932). See also Morley Co. v. Lancaster,
129 U.S. 263, 286 (1889); Henry, 255 F. at 769 (use of "means" language in reference to the
"essence of the invention" would be unacceptable unless the language were construed to cover
"only those [means] which are shown in the patent and their equivalents"). Cf. Tokheim Oil
Tank & Pump Co. v. Dean, 73 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1934) (citing the same treatise passage, but
leaving unclear whether a narrowed construction could save a claim that used "means" language
in reference to the "essence of the invention").
Whether concepts such as the point of novelty, the "essence of the invention," or the
like have any merit generally for utility patents is a proposition worth exploring. The Federal
Circuit continues to speak of the "point of novelty" in various contexts, although at least in the
obviousness context it has rejected the notion of the "heart of the invention." See, e.g., ParaOrdnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int'l, Inc., 73 F.2d 1085, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining
that in the obviousness analysis, the court must consider the claimed subject matter as a whole;
there is no legally cognizable "heart of the invention"); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
721 F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553 (Fed.Cir. 1983).
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the claim. Halliburton seemed to move the functional claiming
doctrine unequivocally in the direction of a rule of invalidity, rather
than predominantly a rule of claim interpretation. Based on the
Halliburton decision, it appeared that if a claim used a functional
expression at the "point of novelty," 57 the claim would not merely be
construed narrowly; it would be held invalid as indefinite. 58 The
focus of functionality analysis shifted to whether the functional
expression resided at the "point of novelty." 59
Among other things, this cast considerable uncertainty over the
dimensions of the functionality doctrine, given the tremendous
elasticity of the point of novelty concept. 60 At another level, it may
57.
In Halliburton,the Court found that the patentee had used a means expression to
describe the "most crucial element" in the claimed combination. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946).
58.
Some courts apparently assumed, without analyzing the matter in depth, that even
Halliburton,a narrowed construction could still save a claim that used a functional expression at
the point of novelty:
We have held that where the novelty that exists in a combination of elements set
forth in the claim, resides in the means, the claim must be limited to such means
as are disclosed and illustrated in the specification. An inventor cannot by the
mere use of the word 'means' appropriate any and all kinds of mechanism which
may perform the specified function or any other mechanism or device than that
which is described in the patent or which is its mechanical equivalent.
Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. v. Turchan, 208 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1953). Cf.S.D. Warren
Co. v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co., 205 F.2d 602, 605 (1st Cir. 1953) (stating that
while courts have "repeatedly held" that functional expressions might run afoul of definiteness
requirements, this rule does not forbid all functional expressions, but rather forbids "the
description of the 'crucial element' of a claim in terms of accomplishment rather than in terms
of physical characteristics; it forbids a statement of function or result at the precise point of
novelty").
59.
Indeed, the HalliburtonCourt attempted to explain away the ContinentalPaperBag
decision on the basis of the point of novelty criterion. While the point of novelty in Halliburton
supposedly lay solely in one of the claim elements that the patentee had expressed functionally,
the point of novelty in Continental PaperBag lay in the "physical and operating relationships"
of all of the parts of the combination, and the patentee had used structural language to specify
those relationships. See Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12-13; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,420-22 (1908).
60.
The Supreme Court's terse opinion in Faulknerv. Gibbs illustrates the point rather
graphically. The Court took the case on certiorari to consider whether the lower court's ruling
upholding the patent claims at issue conflicted with Halliburton. See Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338
U.S. 267 (1949). The Court summarily dismissed the argument that there was any conflict:
We there [in Halliburton] held the patent invalid because its language was too
broad at the precise point of novelty. In the instant case, the patent has been
sustained because of the fact of combination rather than the novelty of any
particular element.
Id. at 267-68. But the same could be said of any "combination" claim, suggesting that courts
that were so inclined could have easily circumvented Halliburtonat their whim. Federal Circuit
case law now makes this argument clear, emphatically rejecting the notion of a separate class of
"combination" claims. For example, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d

1999] FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS-

§ 112,

6 JURISPRUDENCE 249

have created uncertainty as to whether the functional claiming
doctrine was in fact a strategy of claim construction for avoiding
invalidity/ineligibility problems, or simply an invalidity/ineligibility
doctrine itself.
C. The Disclosure-Plus-EquivalentsRestriction as a Central
ClaimingStrategy
In addition to employing the "functionality" doctrine as a
reaction to perceived invalidity problems, in many cases the
invocation of functionality derived directly from then-existing
doctrines of claim construction and claim scope. At least three
rationales oriented to claim interpretation emerge from the cases: a
rule of "strict" construction of combination claims; the general
application of central claiming principles to import detail into the
claim from the disclosure; and, most importantly, the application of
the doctrine of equivalents as it was understood in the context of the
central claiming regime. In many cases, courts commingled these
rationales.
1. "Strict" Construction of Combination Claims
Some cases illustrate that the functionality doctrine has as one of
its progenitors a rule of construction that strictly limited the scope of
"combination" claims. For example, in PortlandGold Mining Co. v.
Hermann,6 1 involving interpretation of the expression "means for
spraying water upon the ore as it passes downwardly over the
perforated plate to the table," 62 the court relied upon general
principles holding that combination claims would be given a
restrictive construction:
In a combination device consisting in congeries of well-known
mechanical appliances, no liberality of construction is accorded to
1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court acknowledged that nearly any patent claim could be
characterized as a claim to a combination of old elements, and asserted that
[tihere is neither a statutory distinction between "combination patents" and some
other, never defined type of patent, nor a reason to treat the conditions for
patentability differently with respect to "combination patents". It but obfuscates
the law to posit a non-statutory, judge-created classification labeled
"combination patents".
Il
Not surprisingly, the author of the Halliburton opinion dissented, albeit in a single
sentence. See id. ("Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that the language of the claims was too
broad at the precise point where there was novelty, if there was novelty anywhere.").
Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Hermann, 160 F. 91 (8th Cir. 1908).
61.
62. Il at 94.
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it to create a monopoly; but it is limited to the descriptive elements
in the combination as expressed in the specifications; and no great
liberality of the doctrine of mechanical equivalents can be
indulged in its favor. As the applicant for such combination of old
devices chooses his own expressions in presenting it, and is
required to enumerate the elements of his claim, he is limited to
63
the combined apparatus as specified.

Similarly, in Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Manufacturing Co.,
the court appeared to draw upon a bias against combination claiming
to derive a disclosed structure plus equivalents rule for functional
claims:
The exact question is the proper interpretation to be given to the
word 'means' and the language immediately following .... The
rule is, therefore, that the scope of a patent upon a combination
should be limited to the specific devices described or their
mechanical equivalents. Applying these principles to claims 14
and 15, it must be held that the interpretation of the words 'means
co-acting with the ends of said pin for detachably connecting the
discharge end of said conduit with said grease cup' should be in
64
the light of the drawings and specification.
Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Manufacturing Co. builds on an
interesting early case, Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Munger Improved
Cotton Machine Manufacturing Co. 65 There, certain of the claims at
issue recited "means for delivering the cotton from the conveyor to
the gin." 66 Reviewing a model of the patentee's device embodying
63.
Id. at 99.
64.
Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Mfg., 73 F.2d 543, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1934); see also
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 10 (noting that "courts have viewed claims to combinations and
improvements or additions to them with very close scrutiny").
The Sixth Circuit applied a similar analysis in a case involving arguably functional
language, albeit language that was not drafted in means plus function format. Criticizing the
patentee's advance over the prior art as "unsubstantial," that court concluded that
the patent must be literally confined to the details which the patentee presents.
Viewed in its most favorable light, the article which appellant's patentee
describes is no more than a combination of old elements and the rule applies that
no one is an infringer of a combination unless his article not only performs the
same function or accomplishes the same result as the patented article but also
performs the function or accomplishes the result by the identical or substantially
identical means.
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Meilink Steel Safe Co., 140 F.2d 519, 521 (6th Cir. 1944). This
language, of course, might alternatively be read as expressing the element-by-element approach
to infringement rather than any special restrictive rule for combinations.
65.
Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Munger Improved Cotton Mach. Mfg., 49 F. 61 (5th Cir.
1891).
66.
Id. at 62 (reciting claims I and 2).
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the invention, the court articulated the following infringement
framework:
In the model presented in the evidence, the same device that was
declared in the design, specification, and claim was shown, and we
consider that he must be held to such a device or means, and not be
permitted to extend his claim to anything of a different character or
description.... Has the defendant adopted, used, and sold a
machine containing such device or any equivalent to it in the
means used for conveying the cotton from the chamber to the
gin? 67
That the court thought it was applying a general rule as to
combinations is evident from the following language:
In combinations, the doctrine of equivalents is construed most
strongly against him who alleges an infringement, and each party
is held to his own element or device, or a positive and exact
equivalent which performs the same functions, in the same
manner, the burden being on the complainant to show this. 68
Here, the fear of functional expressions is resolved into a general
fear of combination claims. Modem courts take a more charitable
view of combination claims, an observation which may prove to be of
value for purposes of the sort of normative assessment of § 112, 6
69
that would be useful in considering legislative reform.
2. Functional Claiming Doctrine as a Straightforward
Application of Central Claiming Principles
In other cases, courts justified narrow interpretations of
functional expressions merely on the basis of the express claim
language or on background principles of central claiming. Under the
central claiming theory, patent claims constituted merely an
exemplary definition of the invention; the court was free to look to
70
the entirety of the specification to define the scope of the invention.
67.
Id. at 65.
68. Il at 67. Interestingly, in defining what constituted an "equivalent" for purposes of
this test, the court relied upon familiar doctrine of equivalents formulations. Id. at 66 ('The
general principle is that, in order to be considered an equivalent of another, one device must
perform the same functions, and perform them in substantially the same way..
69.
I take this up in Part VI.
70.
See, e.g., TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAiMs: THE UNITED
STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN 6-9 (1995) (explaining the central claiming theory and
contrasting the peripheral claiming theory). For a succinct Supreme Court statement of thenexisting claim construction rules reflecting the central claiming theory, see, for example, Fuller
v. Yentzer, 94 U.S. 288, 288 (1876) ("Where the claim immediately follows the description of
the invention, it may be construed in connection with the explanations given in the description;
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Patent lawyers at the time frequently included so-called "back-firing"
expressions such as "substantially as herein described" or the like in
claims. 7 1 Back-firing expressions in one sense restricted the claim by
acknowledging that limitations from the specification might well be
read into the claim, consistent with the court's application of central
claiming principles. On the other hand, such expressions reflected the
patentee's intent to have the claim encompass more than merely that
which was explicitly disclosed in the specification. 72 The resultant
claim scope, then, at least theoretically, was something narrower than
the literal scope of the claims might indicate but broader than the
preferred embodiment described in the written description portion of
the specification.
Accordingly, a court applying these principles to a functional
expression might well read the expression to cover only the means
disclosed in the specification for accomplishing the claimed function,
along with other means substantially similar to the disclosed means.
73
A good early example is Union Match Co. ,v. Diamond Match Co.
There, the claim at issue included the functional expression "means
for giving the box a to and from jarring motion, in a direction out of a
vertical line, and substantially at right angles to the matches as they
74
are to lie in the box, substantially as and for the purpose specified."
The court rejected a construction of this claim that allowed the means
expression to encompass "all possible means for accomplishing the
result," 75 and instead applied a narrowed construction:
The claims in question by direct terms refer to the specification for
the means by which the function, purpose, or object of the
invention is to be accomplished, and to that we must look for
them. 76

Even where the claim included no express "back-firing"
expression, it is quite possible that courts were applying the
background principles of central claiming in any event. 77 In
and, if the claim contains words referring back to the specification, it cannot properly be
construed in any other way.") citing Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516 (1870).
71.
See DELLER, supra note 1, at §§24-25 for a brief explanation of "back-firing"
expressions.
72.
See TAKENAKA, supra note 70, at 9.
73.
Union Match Co. v. Diamond Match Co., 162 F. 148 (8th Cir. 1908).
74.
See id. at 150.
75.
Id at 152 (explaining that "[s]uch comprehensiveness of claim would not be
patentable.").
76.
Id at 152.
77.
Indeed, this observation ties together many of the cases using the functional claiming
doctrine as a claim construction strategy.
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Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Manufacturing Co., for example, the
court, in the course of interpreting a functional expression, made clear
that
Claims must be interpreted in the light of specifications as though
the words 'substantially as described' were incorporated in each
claim and should be limited to7 8this contribution, which is the
invention disclosed by the patent.
Here, too, there are implications for a modem understanding of
§ 112, 6, because these cases reveal that § 112, 6 is founded at
least in part on approaches to claim construction that have long since
79
been discarded.
3. Functional Claiming Doctrine and the Doctrine of
Equivalents in Its Central Claiming Incarnation
It is clear that in a number of early cases applying a structureplus-equivalents restrictive interpretation to functional expressions,
courts thought that they were simply applying the doctrine of
equivalents. For example, in one Sixth Circuit case, the court
remarked that
There was doubtless recognition here that if the claim were
construed so as to include all means for maintaining a slidable
connection, it was too broad, and that the only safe ground upon
which to base infringement was the doctrine of equivalents. 80
Earlier Supreme Court cases seemed to lay the groundwork for
this view. In Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the
Court characterized its infringement analysis of the means expression
at issue as an application of the doctrine of equivalents. 8 1 More
78.
Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Mfg., 73 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1934).
79.
I explore the anachronistic nature of § 112, 6 in more detail in Part VI.
80.
Chicago Forging & Mfg. v. Bade Cummings Mfg., 63 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1933).
The court proceeded to observe that "[o]bviously... the patentee was not entitled to claim all
structures which exercised the desired function, but only those which he himself invented." Id.
at 930-31. Earlier Sixth Circuit cases to the same effect include Davis Sewing Machine Co. v.
New DepartureManufacturing, 217 F. 775, 782-83 (6th Cir. 1914) (means expressions "are
only a convenient formula of the broadest equivalency of which the real invention permits");
Jackson Fence Co. v. Peerless Wire Fence Co., 228 F. 691,699 (6th Cir. 1915) (same). See also
Auditorium Ventilating Corp. v. Greater Rochester Properties, Inc., 59 F.2d 450, 457 (W.D.
N.Y. 1929) (refusing to interpret the means expression at issue to cover all means for
performing the recited function, and instead employing "a limited application of the doctrine of
equivalents" which adequately "affords plaintiff protection for his discoveries").
81.
See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 421 (1908)
(framing the infringement inquiry as follows: "Under all the circumstances of the case, is the
[accused machine] within the doctrine of equivalents?").
The functional claiming doctrine and its apparent connection to the doctrine of
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directly, in Hildreth v. Mastoras,82 the Court expressed the view that
the disclosure-plus-equivalents construction of functional expressions
equivalents also appear prominently in the well-known opinion in Boyden Power-Brake Co. v.
Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537 (1898). The claims at issue did not contain means expressions, but,
Id. at 554. The Court was
according to the Court, were "to a certain extent, for a function .
referring to claim 2 of the patent-in-suit, which read:
In a brake mechanism, the combination of a main air pipe, an auxiliary reservoir,
a brake cylinder, and a triple valve having a piston whose preliminary traverse
admits air from the auxiliary reservoir to the brake cylinder, and which by a
further traverse admits air directly from the main air pipe to the brake cylinder,
substantially as set forth.
IL at 543 (reproducing the text of the claims). The Court recognized the argument that the
claim was merely for the function of admitting air directly from the train pipe to the brake
cylinder, "and is only limited to such function when performed by the further traverse of the
piston of the triple valve." Id. at 554. Rejecting a construction that would have rendered the
claim invalid as merely reciting a function, the Court appeared to apply a disclosure-plusequivalents construction to claim 2:
[I]f the second claim be not susceptible of the interpretation that it is simply for a
function, then the performance of that function must be limited to the particular
means described in the specification for the admission of air from the train pipe
to the brake cylinder.... mhis raises the same question which is raised under
the first and fourth claims, - whether defendants' device contains the auxiliary
valve of the Westinghouse patent, or its mechanical equivalent.
Id. at 557. In so determining that it must read the limitations of the specification into the claim
in order to avoid a validity determination, the Court could also rely on the presence of the
"back-firing" expression "substantially as set forth." Il at 558.
In a later section of the opinion directed at claims 1 and 4, the Court set out the rule
that has become known as the "reverse" doctrine of equivalents:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the
latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent,
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute
has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and
intent.
Id. at 568. It was clear that here, too, the Court was applying a disclosure-plus-equivalents rule,
based upon the presence of the back-firing expression:
Under the very terms of the Westinghouse patent, the infringing device must not
only contain an auxiliary valve, or its mechanical equivalent, but it must contain
the elements of the combination, 'substantially as set forth.' In other words,
there must not only be an auxiliary valve, but substantially such a one as is
described in the patent...
Id. at 569. Significantly, the Federal Circuit has seized on the "reverse doctrine of equivalents"
as set forth in Boyden as a doctrinal antecedent to § 112, 6 equivalency, without recognizing
the more telling underlying connections between the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6
equivalency. See, e.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Properly understood section 112 P 6 operates more like the reverse doctrine of equivalents
than the doctrine of equivalents because it restricts the scope of the literal claim language."); see
also Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[§ 112, 6]
operates more like the reverse doctrine of equivalents than the doctrine of equivalents because it
restricts the coverage of literal claim language.").
82.
Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27 (1921).
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was merely an instance of the application of the doctrine of
equivalents, as that doctrine was then articulated. In Hildreth v.
Mastoras, the claim at issue called for a candy-pulling machine
including "means for producing a specified relative in-and-out motion
of these parts for the purpose set forth." 83 The Court declared that it
was applying the "doctrine of broad equivalents," and found
infringement notwithstanding the fact that the accused device differed
from the precise embodiment disclosed in the specification. 84 Even
Halliburtonitself contains some cryptic references to the doctrine of
85
equivalents.
Although this version of the doctrine of equivalents involved
measuring equivalents to the disclosure, rather than to the claim, 8 6 the
meaning of "equivalency" was the same as that used today under the
modem doctrine of equivalents. 87 Thus, for example, the First Circuit
in Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., construing a means
expression 88 by application of the disclosure-plus-equivalents rule,
referred to a "function-means-result" formulation for equivalency:
[The means expression] too is readily enough identified by the
disclosure, and though it does speak in terms of function that is
inevitable to some degree, if the claim is to have any generality
whatever. The very test of equivalency is in terms of function, 'the
same result by the same means'; and it is only by recourse to that
83.
Id. at 32.
84.
IL at 36.
85.
See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946)
("Yet if Walker's blanket claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now known or
hereafter invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent of Walker's ingredient or not,
could be used in a combination such as this...."); ia- at 10 ("[C]ourts have qualified the scope
of what is meant by the equivalent of an ingredient of a combination of old elements .... ").
At least some scholars at the time appreciated that the Halliburton decision had
implications for the doctrine of equivalents as applied to functional claims. See, e.g., Irons,
supra note 23, at 168 n.9 ("The Halliburton decision also raises a serious question relative to the
proper scope of equivalents which may be afforded an element in a combination claim."). Irons
goes on to argue that the Supreme Court's post-Halliburtondecision in Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338
U.S. 267 (1949) "restore[s] the concept of equivalency as applied to the substitution of elements
in combinations to the pre-Halliburtonstatus." Irons, supra note 23, at 172. This seems a bit
strong, given that Faulkner,by its own terms, can be explained as an application of the "point of
novelty" rule.
86. This, of course, is an artifact of central claiming theory. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text for a brief discussion of the central claiming theory.
87. The changing role of the doctrine of equivalents in the context of the evolution from
central claiming to peripheral claiming was the subject of an abbreviated discussion in WarnerJenkinson. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton David Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997).
88. The functional expression at issue was "operating means connected to said eccentric
device and turning said pivoted device at predetermined intervals." Buono v. Yankee Maid
Dress Corp., 77 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1935).
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standard that a patentee can pass beyond the very details of his
disclosure. Some such latitude being necessary, it is only a
question of how far the functional element is anchored in the
disclosure, and how far it floats as a vague threat to the art. That is
a question of degree, and admits of no general solution, for the
mere use of the word 'means' does not condemn a claim. 89

Other cases state directly that "established rules on the subject"
of equivalency apply. 9 0
Indeed, that courts were applying the established rules flowing
from the doctrine of equivalents is further evidenced by cases
invoking the pioneering invention doctrine. 9 1 For example, in one
case, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals invoked the notion of
the pioneering invention to justify according a range of equivalents to
a means expression:
It is a general rule that one may not claim all means of doing a
thing by a broad means limitation and thereby throttle and prevent
future inventive efforts in the line of improving such means of
doing the particular thing. However, to this general rule there are
certain exceptions. There are certain instances where the invention
is so revolutionary in a pioneering field as to furnish examples of
92

the exception to said general rule.

In another case illustrating a similar approach, a court
determined that the claimed invention was not a pioneering invention,
93
and on that basis applied a disclosure-plus-equivalents construction.
89.
Id.at 277. The court proceeded to apply the rule that means expressions could not
be used at the point of novelty. See id. at 277-78 ("In the case at bar the [means] phrase was
justified because the invention did not reside in the mechanical train connecting the eccentric
with the table ....
90.
[Functional language] will not include all means, mechanism, or devices which
can perform that function, but only those which are shown in the patent and their
equivalents.
And in this case, also, the question whether other means,
mechanism, or devices are equivalents to those shown in the patent will be
determined by the established rules on that subject ....
Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 255 F. 769,779 (9th Cir. 1919).
91.
In general, the pioneering invention doctrine holds that inventions that are
"pioneering" or revolutionary in some sense are to be accorded a particularly broad range of
equivalents in the course of application of the doctrine of equivalents. For a lucid discussion,
see, for example, John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer
Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35 (1995).
92.
In re Smellie, Ill F.2d 651,652 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
93.
United Shoe Mach. Co. v. L.Q. White Shoe Co., 279 F. 35 (1st Cir. 1922). Noting
the non-pioneering status of the claimed invention, the lower court had "concluded that 'the
broad and general language of the claims, 'means for clinching the barrel of the eyelet upon the
lining beneath the outer portion of the upper,' should be restricted to the means described in the
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Finally, the legislative history pertinent to § 112, 6, although
very sparse, also supports the view that § 112, 6 equivalency is
linked to the doctrine of equivalents. 9 4 This alone has significant
implications for modem application of the § 112, 6 equivalency

concept.
Unfortunately, as detailed in the following Parts, modem courts
seem to take little guidance from pre-1952 case law on functional
claiming, instead imposing a wholly unnecessary layer of
complicating rules that should be reformed.

m.FUNCTIONAL EXPRESSIONS AND THE LITERAL INFRINGEMENT
ANALYSIS

The historical synthesis in Part II seeks to demonstrate, among
other things, that § 112, 6 was not a novel statutory contrivance, but

rather was derived from a considerable body of case law. To be
certain, the rules enumerated in that case law are not terribly precise,
and may even be criticized as archaic. This may make the case for a
legislative overhaul of § 112, [6, an argument that I take up in Part

VI.
On the other hand, the pre-1952 case law does provide lessons
for the modem application of § 112, 6. For example, the case law
clearly indicates a link between § 112, 6 equivalency and the
However, aside from some passing
doctrine of equivalents.
acknowledgments, the law of § 112, 6 equivalents as enunciated by
the Federal Circuit has come largely unmoored from its pre-1952
antecedents. 95 The principal evidence of this phenomenon is the rise
patent or substantial equivalents'...." Id.at 37. The First Circuit approved of this
construction. IL The District Court opinion reveals that the court was concerned that a broader
construction would amount to a patent on a result. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. L.Q. White Shoe
Co., 270 F. 650 (D. Mass. 1919) (citing, inter alia, O'Reilly v. Morse).
Congressman Joseph R. Bryson declared, in an address that was made part of the
94.
Congressional Record, that the new section 112 "will give statutory sanction to combinationclaiming as it was understood before the Halliburton decision. All the elements of a
combination now will be able to be claimed in terms of what they do as well as in terms of what
they are.... This provision also gives recognition to the existence of the doctrine of
equivalents." See 98 CONG. REc. A415, 82d Congress 2d Sess. 1952, cited in Robert S.Smith,
Functional Claims and the PatentAct of 1952, 48 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 426, 432 (1966). See
also id.at 432-36 (discussing relevant portions of the legislative history).
For another detailed study of the legislative history, see Hofmann & Heller, supra
note 45, at 274-82 (demonstrating that the structure-plus-equivalents notion appeared in the
earliest proposals for a statutory provision speaking to functional claiming).
95.
The Supreme Court, at least, has recently made passing reference to the connection
between § 112, 6 equivalents and the doctrine of equivalents, noting in Warner-Jenkinson that
the reference to "equivalents" in § 112, 6 could be taken as "an application of the doctrine of
equivalents in a restrictive role, narrowing the application of broad literal claim elements."
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of the concept of "structural equivalency" to describe the nature of the

§ 112,

6 equivalents inquiry. The first step in reforming § 112,

6

jurisprudence, using pre-1952 antecedents as a guide, is to expunge
96
the concept of structural equivalents from the law.
To its credit, the Federal Circuit has clearly delineated § 112,
6's impact on the literal infringement prong of the modem bipolar
infringement regime. In numerous opinions, the court has declared
that to satisfy literally a means-plus-function expression, an accused
device must "perform the identical function as that identified in the
means clause and do so with structure that is the same as or
equivalent to that disclosed in the specification." 97
This construction, of course, creates the apparent anomaly of an

equivalency concept residing within a literal infringement analysis.
Quite reasonably, the Federal Circuit anticipated that lower courts
might erroneously assume that the effect of § 112, 6 is to conflate
the literal infringement and doctrine of equivalents regimes for means
expressions. The Federal Circuit has taken great pains to guide the
judiciary away from this course. In Valmont IndustriesInc. v. Reinke
Manufacturing Co., for example, the court insisted that § 112, 6 and
the doctrine of equivalents "have separate origins and purposes," 9 8 an
understanding which is periodically repeated in Federal Circuit
opinions. 99 The court has erected a firewall between the literal
infringement framework that applies to means expressions and the
doctrine of equivalents framework that applies to all types of
expressions.
Unfortunately, these zealous efforts to maintain the integrity of
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,27 (1997).
96.
That is, the Federal Circuit should recognize that all equivalents are created
equivalent- specifically, that § 112, 6 equivalents share common characteristics and heritage
with equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents, as detailed in this Part.
97.
Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See also Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Pennwalt Corp.
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755
F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
98.
Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043. As the court elaborated, "[s]ection 112, 6 limits the
broad language of means-plus-function limitations in combination claims to equivalents of the
structures, materials, or acts in the specification. The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands
exclusive patent rights." Id. For a criticism of this assertion, see Janis, supra note 7, at 212-16,
225.
99.
See, e.g., Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d,
1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[lt is well understood that 'equivalents' under section 112
paragraph 6 is a different concept from 'equivalents' under the judicially created doctrine of
equivalents...."); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("While equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents and equivalency under § 112, 6,
both relate to insubstantial changes, each has a separate origin, purpose and application.").
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the bipolar infringement regime by pointing to differences in the
respective infringement frameworks seem to have inspired the belief
that there must necessarily be meaningful differences in the respective
underlying equivalency concepts.100 The Federal Circuit has, over
the past several years, verbalized this supposed distinction between
equivalency concepts by referring to § 112, 6 equivalents as
"structural" equivalents.101
The root of all confusion over § 112, 6 equivalency may well
lie here, with the emergence of the unproductive, and ultimately
misleading, concept of "structural" equivalency. As I outline below,
the first step in reforming the Federal Circuit's § 112,
6
jurisprudence should be to banish the concept of structural
equivalency. The second should be to recognize the relevancy of
Graver Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products and Warner
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. concepts of equivalency
to the § 112, 6 determination, under the general principle that all
equivalents are created equivalent.
A. Banishing "StructuralEquivalency"from § 112, 5[T6
Jurisprudence
The text of § 112, 6 does not refer to "structural equivalents."
It speaks of "the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof." Observing this, some
judges, including Judge Rich, have voiced a fundamental, text-based
objection to the concept of structural equivalency.102
100.
See Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Plager, J., additional views) (pointing out that the existing approach to § 112, 6 equivalency
seems to assume that "there are clearly defined operational differeices" between doctrine of
equivalents equivalency and § 112, 6 equivalency, and that "triers of fact... can readily
differentiate them").
101.
Some commentators have followed suit. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Reconciling
Section 112, Paragraph6 Literal Equivalents with the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Wake of
Hilton-Davis,in PLI's THIRD ANNuAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 291,
306 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Course Handbook Series No. G4-4008,
1997) ("A § 112, 6 literal, 'structural' equivalent, is simply a different animal than what one
finds under the doctrine of equivalents.").
102. DeGraffenried v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 458,479 (1990):
mhe term "equivalent" in Section 112 should not be interpreted as being limited
to structures that are "equivalent" to the physical structure of the "means"
disclosed in a patent. The literal wording of Section 112 contains no such
requirement. The statute merely refers to structures "described in the
specification and equivalents thereof." It does not state that the only possible
"equivalents" to the structures described in the specification are devices with
equivalent physical structures, i.e., it does not provide structures "described in
the specification and structural equivalents thereof."
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Although textual analysis of § 112,

6 is chancy at best, this

absence of any crystal clear textual foundation for the structural

equivalency rubric raises certain doubts about the Federal Circuit's
ready adherence to structural equivalency. A brief glance at historical

practice only intensifies these doubts.

Structural equivalency has

remarkably shallow roots in U.S. patent law. Prior to the Federal
Circuit era, courts referred to structural equivalency only rarely and in
passing, and never, insofar as I have been able to determine, in the

context of § 112, 6 determinations.10 3

Within the means-plus-function context, the structural
equivalency concept is essentially a child of the 1990's.104 Judge
Nies referred to structural equivalency in an influential opinion,
Judge Rich has expressed his position on the issue in Baltimore Therapeutic Equip.
Co. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 26 F.3d 138, Nos. 93-1301, 93-1331, 1994 WL 124022 (Fed.
Cir. April 12, 1994) (non-precedential):
I can agree with the majority's generalized statement that to meet a
means-plus-function limitation an accused device must perform the function
named in the means clause "and perform that function using the structure
disclosed in the specification or an equivalent structure.".. . That is what section
112 paragraph 6 says. But that does not necessarily mean that a structural
equivalent of what the specification discloses must be used. The two emphasized
expressions sound very similar but they connote very different concepts and
should not be confused.
BaltimoreTherapeutic, 1994 WL 124022 at *6 (Rich, J, concurring).
103.
The phrase "structural equivalent" or variations thereof appears only very
infrequently in U.S. patent cases prior to the Federal Circuit era, and never, insofar as I have
been able to determine, in the context of § 112, 6. Instead, the phrase is applied loosely (and
perhaps improperly) in a handful of cases on obviousness. See, e.g., Chiplets, Inc. v. June Diary
Prods., 114 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (D. N. J. 1953) ("When these claims are thus construed the
complete absence of patentable invention is evident. The alleged invention comprises nothing
more than an assemblage of old elements, or their structural equivalents, in a combination in
which they perform no new or different function. It is well established that such an assemblage
is not a patentable invention."); see also In re Ruff, 256 F.2d 590, 599 (C.C.P.A. 1958)
(referring to a Pro obviousness argument urging "the existence of an actual art-recognizable
'structural' equivalence between the prior art amino compounds and the claimed mercapto
compounds, over and above any implied admission of such equivalence due to inclusion in a
Markush group or expressly admitted functional equivalence"). Interestingly enough, the term
also shows up on rare occasions in reference to the doctrine of equivalents. Reese v. Elkhart
Welding & Boiler Works, Inc., 447 F.2d 517, 527 (7th Cir. 1971) ("Infringement exists if the
accused device is the structural equivalent of the device described in a patent, and performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve the same results, even
though it differs in form or shape.").
104.
There is a rather oblique reference to structural equivalence in Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Texas
Instruments ('TI') again asserts that because its Patent No. 3,819,921 describes a 'pioneer'
invention the claims should be given an enhanced breadth of interpretation, such that the
extensive technological changes that have occurred since this invention was made should be
deemed not only functional equivalents but also structural equivalents in terms of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 16.").
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Johnston v. IVAC:
[F]or a means-plus-function limitation to read on an accused
device, the accused device must incorporate the means for
performing the function disclosed in the specification or a
structural equivalent of that means, plus it must perform the
identical function. Section 112 P 6 can never provide a basis for
finding that a means-plus-function claim element is met literally
where the function part of the element is not literally met in an
10 5
accused device.
Unfortunately, the unquestioning usage of the structural
equivalency rubric in connection with § 112, 6 equivalency has now
become the rule in Federal Circuit 10 6 and District Court opinions. 107
But it is important to understand that structural equivalency is
the product of the nearly instantaneous absorption of Federal Circuit
dicta into U.S. patent law, not the product of any carefully considered
historical evolution that might warrant special allegiance.
While the structural equivalency rubric draws little or no support
from text or history, it enjoys even less justification as a conceptual
matter. This is the principal failing of structural equivalency: it is
conceptually empty. 10 8
A crucial flaw in the concept of structural equivalency is that it
seems to demand an equivalency comparison that focuses exclusively
on physical structure. 109 The result, in many cases, is a particularly
105.
Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis supplied).
106.
See Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cole v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J., dissenting); Alpex
Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Valmont Indus., Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods.,
Inc. Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("substantial structural equivalent"); Intel Corp. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
107.
A few recent examples from District Court opinions include Brita Wasser-FilterSysteme GmbH v. Recovery Eng'g, Inc., No. 97 C 3915, 1998 WL 473467, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 7, 1998); Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods. v. Groupe Procycle, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-396
MMS, 1998 WL 290296, at *6, *8 (D. Del. May 20, 1998); Coinstar, Inc. v. Coinbank
Automated Sys., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1109, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Howes v. Zircon Corp., 992
F.Supp. 957,963 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
108.
Unfortunately, the most insightful judicial pronouncements on the subject appear in
sources not likely to be perceived as authoritative: a 1990 Court of Federal Claims decision and
Judge Rich's concurring opinion in a non-precedential Federal Circuit case. See DeGraffenried
v. United States, 20 CI.Ct. 458, 479-81 (1990); Baltimore Therapeutic Equip. Co. v. Loredan
Biomedical, Inc., 26 F.3d 138, Nos. 93-1301, 93-1331, 1994 WL 124022 at *6-*8 (Fed. Cir.
April 12, 1994) (non-precedential).
109.
The Federal Circuit's statements in Alpex seem to reflect this rigid adherence to
assessing equivalency of physical structure. The court insisted that the patentee's expert
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cramped form of equivalency analysis that provides the patentee an
unduly restrictive literal claim scope, at best. Where § 112, 6
equivalency extends only to physically "equivalent" structure, it
seems likely that competitors can avoid the literal scope of the claim
merely by substituting structure that differs physically from the
structure disclosed in the specification, even if the substituted
structure is a known variant of the disclosed structure, performs the
same function as the disclosed structure, and yields the same result as
the disclosed structure. 1 10 A patentee attempting to escape this
outcome would seem to confront equally unpalatable choices: either
to abandon the means terminology altogether, or to disclose explicitly
all known structures for performing the function called out in the
means clause. 111
But this simply cannot be what Congress had in mind when it
injected an equivalency concept into § 112, 6. The very notion of
equivalency under § 112, 6 is rendered meaningless if the patentee
must explicitly disclose known "equivalents." Such a construction
effectively reads the equivalency notion out of the statute. Moreover,
as the historical synthesis plainly shows, there has long been a link
between the doctrine of equivalents (as understood in a central
claiming regime) and the "equivalents" available under a "structure
plus equivalents" construction of a functional expression."l 2
Furthermore, this interpretation of § 112, 6 equivalency does
not square with the prevailing understanding that § 112, 6 was

testimony on the § 112, 6 equivalency issue amounted to "no more than an analysis of
functional equivalency." Alpex, 102 F.3d at 1222. According to the court, testimony that both
the accused Nintendo system and the disclosed bit map device both stored data and eventually
displayed an image on the whole screen was testimony as to function. Because the patentee's
expert "did not compare the structure of the [Nintendo product] with the bit map structure
disclosed in the specification," the expert testimony was ineffective to demonstrate § 112, 6
equivalency. Id.
110.
[L]imiting literal infringement of "means plus function" claims to objects that
have physical structure equivalent to those objects specifically described in the
patent specification could seriously undermine the usefulness of such claims.
Under such an interpretation, literal infringement of a claim may be avoided
simply by replacing the structures specifically described in the patent
specification with known functional equivalents that operate in substantially the
same way but have fundamentally different structures.
DeGraffenried,20 Cl.Ct. at 480.
111.
See id. at 481 (in order to escape the strictures of structural equivalency, "a patent
owner would reasonably have to include in the patent specification an exhaustive list of
structures that possibly could perform each function described in the claim").
112.
See supraPart II.C.
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intended as a response to Halliburton.113 In Halliburton,the Supreme
Court seemed bent on placing an extremely high price tag on the use
of means expressions: such expressions would apparently render a
claim invalid unless the patentee expressly disclosed all alternative
means for performing the function recited in the means plus function
clause. 114 Congress, through § 112, 6, refused to limit the literal
reach of means expressions so severely, declaring that means
expressions would cover the corresponding disclosed structure and
equivalents thereof. The § 112, 6 equivalency concept is, of course,
the key to Congress's compromise. To the extent that courts restrict
§ 112, 6 equivalency nearly out of existence, courts come very close
to reading § 112, 6 as reinstating Halliburton,not responding to it.
Additionally, the rigid version of equivalency prompted by the
"structural equivalency" label is at odds with accumulated learning on

the operation of equivalency notions in U.S. patent law, which views
equivalency as a flexible tool for advancing "general fairness." 115
Structural equivalency, in short, renders equivalency "the prisoner of
a formula," and thus runs at odds with accepted judicial
pronouncements as to the nature of equivalency as developed in
1 16
connection with the doctrine of equivalents.
Finally, the structural equivalency rubric is conceptually empty
because it seems to operate primarily as a cover for a priori
conclusions of no equivalency. This seems particularly evident given
that nearly any minute change in structural geometry seems to be
sufficient to preclude any finding of structural equivalency.' 17 Judge
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997)
113.
").The Warner-Jenkinson court
("Congress enacted § 112, 6 in response to Halliburton ....
characterized the provision as "a targeted cure to a specific problem," and opined that the
"equivalents" language amounted to "no more than a prophylactic against the side effects of that
cure." I at 28.
See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 11 (1946)
114.
(criticizing the patentee because "[n]either in the specification, the drawing, nor in the
claims... was there any indication that the patentee contemplated any specific structural
alternative for the acoustical resonator...").
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. Cir.
115.
1995) (en banc), rev'd sub nom Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997). The Supreme Court expressed similar sentiments in Warner-Jenkinson, refusing to
"micro-manage" the Federal Circuit's "particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence."
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)
116.
("Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum.").
117.
In Chiuminatta, the alleged infringer argued that for an accused structure to be
equivalent to a disclosed structure in the § 112, 6 sense, the accused structure "must include
substantially all of the structured features" of the disclosed structure. Chiuminatta Concrete
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Rich offers a lucid illustration demonstrating how the structural
equivalency concept falters in even the simplest of technological
contexts. The illustration poses a question that seems almost
embarrassingly simple and mundane: what is the "structural
equivalent" of a nail? The question would arise, for example, in a
literal infringement analysis of a claim that recited a part A, another
part B, and "means for securing parts A and B together in a fixed
relationship," where the specification discloses that A and B are made
of wood and secured together with nails. 118
At first glance, it would seem that the likely scope of § 112, 6
equivalency would be large. Certainly, of the endless varieties of
fasteners or other securing mechanisms,1 1 9 it seems quite possible that
large numbers of them would be suitable for use in the context of the
claimed invention. That is, although evidence on the point would be
required, it seems safe to guess that quite a number of securing
mechanisms would probably be known to be interchangeable with
nails in the context of the invention as a whole, or would likely be
considered obvious variants of nails in the context of the invention as
a whole.
But the structural equivalency rubric could easily be used to
deny § 112, 6 equivalency for most, if not all, such securing
mechanisms. The accused infringer who substitutes, say, adhesive for
nails can obviously point to dramatic "structural" differences and
argue that there is no structural equivalency, and hence no § 112, 6
equivalency. The accused infringer who substitutes magnets or even
clamps seems equally well-positioned. Even the accused infringer
who substitutes screws could argue, of course, that screws are
fundamentally different structurally from nails. The structural
equivalency rubric elevates these arguments and discounts all of the
myriad other forms of equivalency evidence that may be far more
illuminating than hypertechnical attempts to characterize structural
geometry. Indeed, the structural equivalency rubric would seem to
encourage a regime in which any structure which is not literally a nail
is very likely outside the scope of the means expression. This is a
regime in which structural equivalency is little more than a felicitous
shorthand for no equivalency.

Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court did not
explicitly endorse this test but seemed to apply it in its analysis.
118.
See Baltimore Therapeutic Equip. Co. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 26 F.3d 138,
Nos. 93-1301, 93-1331, 1994 WL 124022, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 1994).
119.
Id.
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B. IncorporatingGraver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson
Equivalency Concepts into § 112, 1[ 6 LiteralInfringement
Determinations
The structural equivalency rubric should be banished for the
reasons that I have outlined above. It does not convey useful
concepts, and may corrode the § 112, 6 equivalency analysis by
Eliminating
masking a priori conclusions of no equivalency.
"structural equivalency" from the § 112, 6 vocabulary might clear
the way for a more carefully nuanced articulation of the test for § 112,
6 equivalency.
The most important point to grasp here is that the court need not
start from scratch. Quite to the contrary, traditional indicia of
equivalency developed in connection with the doctrine of equivalents
could enrich § 112, 6 equivalency jurisprudence. Though it would
be unwise for the Federal Circuit to construct an inflexible, exclusive
6 equivalency, the court could reform its
test for § 112,
jurisprudence by recognizing explicitly that the following
§ 112,
6 equivalency
considerations
are relevant to
20
determinations.1
1. Insubstantial Differences
The Federal Circuit, in its en banc Hilton-Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. opinion, expressed a preference for framing
equivalency issues under the doctrine of equivalents as questions of
the insubstantiality of the differences between the accused device and
the claimed invention. 121 The notion of insubstantial differences, for
whatever minimal analytic content it might contain, should be equally
applicable to § 112, 6 equivalency determinations. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has already recognized that § 112, 6 equivalency
and doctrine of equivalents equivalency both invoke "the familiar
concept of an insubstantial change which adds nothing of
significance."' 122 Confirming this principle today would at least have
120.
For a prior analysis pointing to the intersections between § 112, 6 equivalency and
equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents, see Janis, supra note 7, at 221-24. See also
Laurence H. Pretty & Janene Bassett, Reconciling Section 112, Paragraph6 With the Doctrine
of Equivalents in the Wake of Warner-JenkinsonCo. v. Hilton Davis Chemical, in PLI'S THIRD
ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 359, 373-74 (PLI Patents,

Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-4008, 1997)
(considering the congruence between § 112, 6 equivalency analysis and equivalency analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents in the wake of Warner-Jenkinson).
121.
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court
122.
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the symbolic effect of indicating that similarities between the two
123
equivalency determinations would be taken seriously.
2. Known Interchangeability
Evidence that an accused device includes structure that was
known to those of ordinary skill in the art to be interchangeable with
the disclosed structure corresponding to a means clause should also
be relevant to § 112, 6 equivalency determinations. Evidence of
interchangeability should, of course, be tailored to the context of the
claimed invention; evidence of interchangeability in the abstract
should be viewed with caution.
The Federal Circuit seems inclined to consider interchangeability
evidence in § 112, [6 context, 124 but tends to receive it with
substantial skepticism. For example, in Chiuminatta Concrete
Concepts, Inc. v. CardinalIndustries, Inc [hereinafter Chiuminatta],
the patentee argued that the accused wheels were interchangeable
with the disclosed skid plate. The court accepted that known
interchangeability could be a factor in determining equivalency, but
was extremely parsimonious in its application to the facts at hand:
This argument is not persuasive. Almost by definition, two
structures that perform the same function may be substituted for
one another. The question of known interchangeability is not
whether both structures serve the same function, but whether it
125
was known that one structure was an equivalent of another.
qualified its assertion carefully, stating "[i]n the context of section 112, however, an equivalent
results from an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the structure,
material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification." Id. See also Dawn Equip. Co. v.
Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., additional views)
(pointing out that the fact that both tests invoke the notion of insubstantial change "suggests at
the least that the tests for equivalence under the statute and the doctrine are quite similar, if not
the same").
123.
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 1998), the court rejected the patentee's effort to rely upon alleged "insubstantial
differences" to establish § 112, 6 equivalency. The patentee had argued that the accused
wheels and the disclosed metal plate were equivalent because in use, the wheels compressed to
form "flattened planes," like the flattened planes formed by the metal plate. Id. The court
declared that the "fundamental flaw" in the patentee's argument "is that 'flattened planes' are
not structure." Id. Such an analysis gives the appearance of strict adherence to structural
equivalency. A more acceptable analysis would have weighed the evidence of structural
dissimilarities against the evidence of insubstantial differences rather than dismissing the latter
out of hand as being unrelated to structure.
124. See, e.g., Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1309-10; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab.,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (referring in passing to lack of interchangeability
between accused and disclosed structures).
125.
Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1309-10.
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These sentiments, have some merit. The court should look
carefully for evidence that those of ordinary skill in the art would
have recognized the alleged interchangeability.1 26 On the other hand,
the court must avoid becoming so enamored of the comparison of
structure that it renders § 112, 6 equivalency a nullity and forces the
patentee to accept coverage over nothing more than the disclosed
structure. 127
3. Obvious Variation

The use of obviousness as an analog for equivalency under the
doctrine of equivalents is a familiar practice in foreign patent systems

and is periodically mentioned in connection with the U.S. doctrine of
equivalents. 128 Evidence that an accused structure is a mere obvious
variation of the disclosed structure corresponding to a means clause
should be relevant to determinations of § 112, 6 equivalency. 129 At
least one District Court seems to have considered evidence of

obviousness in a § 112, 6 determination, in a case later affirmed by
130
the Federal Circuit.

126.
The court plainly had concluded that the patentee's interchangeability evidence was
deficient in this regard. See i& at 1310 ("Chiuminatta has not alleged that those of ordinary skill
in the art recognized the interchangeability of metal plates with wheels for supporting the
surface of concrete.").
127.
This may have occurred in Chiuminatta. The court insisted that interchangeability
evidence "does not obviate the statutory mandate to compare the accused structure to the
corresponding structure." Id. In addition, the court seemed to indicate that only by explicit
disclosures in the specification could the patentee really prove known interchangeability:
Significantly, the patent discusses the use of wheels in the context of supporting
and stabilizing the saw, but never once suggests that wheels could perform the
function of the skid plate .... [T]here is no hint in the specification that the skid
plate could be replaced by small wheels adjacent to the blade for supporting the
concrete.
L It would be an extremely unfortunate development if known interchangeability
could be evidenced only by express statements in the specification. Equivalency under § 112,
6 is of no meaning if it can be established only through express disclosure.
See, e.g., Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
128.
(Nies, J., additional views) ("A substitution in a patented invention cannot be both nonobvious
and insubstantial. I would apply nonobviousness as the test for the 'insubstantial change'
requirement of Hilton Davis.").
The time frame for this obviousness analysis would require some careful
129.
consideration. It might be appropriate to measure obviousness in this context as of the time of
the infringement, to enable the patentee to receive coverage over technologies developed after
the filing of the patent application. The timing issue also arose in Chiuminatta, in connection
with the application of the doctrine of equivalents to means expressions. See Chiuminatta, 145
F.3d at 1310. See also infra Part HLI.B.
See Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
130.
(BNA) 1768 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (Finding No. 57), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The
author represented Endress + Hauser in the matter.
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4. Substantial Similarity of "Way"

The familiar function, way, result analysis remains important to
equivalency determinations under the doctrine of equivalents, both as
a matter of providing an overall framework for equivalency analysis
and for testing equivalency at the level of individual claim
limitations. 131 The Federal Circuit should expressly recognize that
evidence establishing substantial similarity of "way" (that is, evidence
that relevant components in the accused device operate in
substantially the same way as do the disclosed components) is
relevant to § 112, 6 equivalency determinations. 132
In a sense, this follows from what has been outlined already,
because the "way" prong of the equivalency analysis may function
mainly as a vehicle for importing a wide range of considerations,
including known interchangeability, obvious variation, insubstantial
differences, and so forth, into the equivalency analysis. However, it
is particularly important that the Federal Circuit expressly embrace
the way prong in the § 112, 6 context, for several reasons. First, the
"way" prong has demonstrated, through long evolution in the context
of the doctrine of equivalents, that it is the most vigorous of the
function-way-result family; many judges deciding doctrine of
equivalents cases on the basis of the tripartite test seem to find the
"way" prong to be the most effective tool for equivalency. 133 To
deny courts access to the "way" analysis in the § 112, 6 context is to
relegate courts to a crabbed, narrow analysis of equivalency.1 34
Second, it is important for the Federal Circuit to endorse
expressly the use of the "way" prong in § 112, 6 equivalency
analyses because existing Federal Circuit case law could be read as
expressing hostility to the notion. The Federal Circuit steadfastly
131.
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-29
(1997) (doctrine of equivalents is analyzed on element-by-element basis); id. at 40 ("An
analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will...
inform the inquiry as to whether the substitute element matches the function, way, and result of
the claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different from
the claimed element.").
132.
The "substantially the same result" prong may also be useful.
133.
See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 940-41 n.3 (Bennett, J., dissenting)
("mhe relevant inquiry, as it is in nearly all doctrine of equivalents analyses, is whether the
accused device and the claimed invention perform the same overall function to achieve the same
overall result in substantiallythe same way.").
134.
If I am correct that the "way" prong is a vehicle for other traditional indicia of
equivalency, then denying courts access to the "way" prong in applying § 112, [6 may be
tantamount to denying courts access to most or all traditional indicia of equivalency, leaving
room for an analysis based solely upon structural equivalency.
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insisted in Valmont Industries Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co. that
"[a] determination of section 112 equivalence does not involve the
35 To the
equitable tripartite test of the doctrine of equivalents."1
extent that this means that the full function-way-result test, in its
entirety, cannot be used to determine § 112, 6 equivalency, this
proposition is true. Courts should not purport to analyze substantial
similarity of function when determining § 112, 6 equivalency,
because the literal infringement framework for means expressions
already calls for the accused device to perform the identical function
recited in the claim. But this does not rule out (and should not be
read to rule out) reliance on the "way" prong (and the result prong)
for determining § 112, 6 equivalency. 136 Indeed, a reading that
eliminates use of the "way" prong in § 112, 6 analyses would
137
conflict with previous decisions.
Finally, a Federal Circuit acknowledgment that the way prong
may be used in determining § 112, 6 equivalency would confirm
that courts are free to consider factors going beyond a structures-only
comparison. To some extent, this would validate existing practices,
in which courts seem instinctively to gravitate towards at least some
cautious and attenuated version of the way prong in their § 112, 6
equivalency analyses. A good recent example in a District Court case
is Judge Ellis' opinion in Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology
Corp.138 Judge Ellis commenced his § 112, 6 equivalency inquiry
by elaborating on physical structural differences between the accused
device and the disclosed structure corresponding to the relevant
means language. 139 This is a pure "structural" equivalency approach,
and, predictably, it cut against any finding of equivalency. But Judge
Ellis extended the analysis beyond a rigid comparison of structure:
"[s]econd, the structures, because they are physically different,
135.
Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
136.
See Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Plager, J.,
additional views) ("With regard to the suggestion in Valmont that the function-wayresult test is not applicable to determining equivalence under § 112, 6, it is not readily
apparent why use of the 'way' and 'result' parts of the tripartite tests ... would not also be
helpful in the § 112, 6 context."). Judge Plager also points out that in view of recent
statements equating the tripartite test with notions of insubstantial differences, the applicability
of the way and result prongs to § 112, 6 equivalency is even more evident. See id. at 1019-20.
137.
See Janis, supra note 7, at 221-22 (discussing early Federal Circuit and pre-Federal
Circuit decisions adopting GraverTank principles in § 112, 6 equivalency determinations).
Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F.Supp.2d 807 (E.D. Va. 1998).
138.
139.
See id.
at 814 ("In the disclosed structure, the gear is a disc or cylinder with teeth that
fit with the teeth of another gear, thus enabling the disclosed gear to move in conjunction with
the bin array, whereas the cam followers [of the accused device] are smooth pins attached to the
array by a stem, and turn independently from the array.").
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perform the claim function differently. Here the gear turns the bins
about a single rod, whereas the cam followers, in conjunction with the
lead screw and the ball slide, turn the bins by following the path of
the cam." 140 This surely is an analysis of substantial similarity of
"way," albeit one that is closely fettered to structure.
Even this very limited "way" analysis seems to make the
outcome of the equivalency determination more palatable. The
equivalency analysis would potentially be much richer had the court
been free to employ the range of traditional indicia of equivalency in
addition to the pure comparison of structure. The rigid limitations of
structural equivalency cramped Judge Ellis' style. 14 1 Perhaps it also
discouraged the litigants from introducing evidence relevant to other
indicia of equivalency, such as interchangeability or the like, which
might have facilitated a more thorough and meaningful evaluation of
equivalency.
Another recent District Court decision illustrates how a
departure from strict structural equivalency could be the key
determinant of the outcome of a literal infringement analysis
involving means expressions. In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Oki
Electric Indus.,142 Wang's patent for computer memory modules
included a claim containing the means expression, "support means for
supporting the memory module at an angle with respect to the printed
circuit motherboard when the memory module is installed
thereon ....
,"143 The patent disclosed a leaded module, meaning, of
course, that the module included terminals having leads attached, the
leads being sized and positioned to fit into holes formed in a
motherboard. Once positioned in the motherboard, the leads were
soldered for support. 144 The accused device, by contrast, included a
"leadless" module, meaning that the module's terminal pads included
no leads. In use of the leadless module, a gripping socket is first
140.
1&
141.
Indeed, Judge Ellis emphasized the limited opportunity to show § 112, 6 afforded
by current Federal Circuit case law, stating "unless the accused structure reads very closely on
the disclosed structure, the two will not be deemed equivalent under § 112, 6." Id. at 811
(proceeding to note that under Chiuminatta, the lack of § 112, 6 equivalency is fatal not only
to literal infringement, but also to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in the usual
case). See infra Part IV.B. for an analysis of Chiuminatta'simpact on the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents for means expressions.
142. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Oki Elec. Indus., 15 F.Supp.2d. 166 (D.Mass. 1998).
143.
lId at 173.
144. See id. at 178. The court here refers simply to "Wang's leaded modules." I am
presuming for purposes of this discussion that the court is referring to the disclosure appearing
in the patent-in-suit.
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plugged into the motherboard, and the leadless module is then
14 5
inserted into the socket.
A structures-only comparison - i.e., a strict adherence to
structural equivalency - presumably would have resulted in a
finding of no § 112, 6 equivalency on these facts. In the accused
device, the absence of leads on the module and the presence of the
intervening gripping socket surely would have supported a finding of
no structural equivalency as that label has commonly been applied.
Interestingly, though, although the court made reference to the
"structural equivalency" standard, it actually allowed for a much
more wide-ranging equivalency analysis incorporating traditional
equivalency indicia. The court was particularly taken by the special
master's determination (based upon an admission made by defendant
Oki) that "the two support mechanisms were used interchangeably at
the time Wang acquired its patents."'14 6 The court also approved of
what appears to have been a very generous application of the
"substantially the same way" analysis. 147 Ultimately, the court
accepted the special master's finding of equivalency. Whether or not
this finding would survive eventual Federal Circuit scrutiny is
difficult to determine based upon the facts revealed in the opinion.
The case may well, however, present the Federal Circuit with a clear
methodological choice between the pure structural equivalency
approach and an approach that recognizes the value of traditional
indicia of equivalency. If it has the opportunity, the court should
choose the latter.
To summarize, traditional principles of equivalency developed
under the doctrine of equivalents for determining equivalency to a
limitation transfer readily to § 112, 6 equivalency determinations.
The underlying principle at work here is that equivalents under the
doctrine and equivalents under § 112, 6 are nearly indistinguishable.
They are not equals in the strictest sense: equivalency to a limitation
under the doctrine can be analyzed by determining the similarity of
See id.
145.
Id. Interestingly, the court also agreed with the special master's rejection of
146.
defendant Old's argument as to interchangeability, noting "[t]he special master rejected Old's
claim that structural equivalency would require complete interchangeability between leaded and
leadless modules. Old pushes the concept of structural equivalency too far with this argument."
Id.
The court pointed out that according to the special master, although the accused and
147.
disclosed devices "work differently," there was nonetheless equivalency, because "each module
uses the terminal pads to connect to the motherboard in some way. Each support system
supports the module equally effectively, providing the same resistance to torsion." Wang Lab.,
15 F. Supp.2d at 178.
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function, way, and result; equivalency to the structure corresponding
to a means expression can be analyzed by determining the similarity
of way and result, and identity of function. Thus, while it is incorrect
to say that all equivalents are created equal, it is correct to say that all
equivalents are created equivalent.
In Chiuminatta, the Federal Circuit has finally provided
commentary leading towards this result. As the court put it:
Although an equivalence analysis under § 112, 6, and the
doctrine of equivalents are not coextensive (for example, § 112,
6, requires identical, not equivalent function) and have different
origins and purposes, their tests for equivalence are closely
related... Both § 112, 6, and the doctrine of equivalents protect
the substance of a patentee's right to exclude by preventing mere
colorable differences or slight improvements from escaping
infringement, the former, by incorporating equivalents of disclosed
structures into the literal scope of a functional claim limitation, and
the latter, by holding as infringements equivalents that are beyond
the literal scope of the claim. They do so by applying similar
148
analyses of insubstantiality of the differences.
This is a good start towards articulating a more meaningful,
better grounded § 112, 6 equivalency analysis. 14 9
IV. FUNCTIONAL EXPRESSIONS AND THE DOcmmE OF
EQUIVALENTS

If all equivalents are, indeed, created equivalent, what does this
say for application of the doctrine of equivalents to a means
expression where literal infringement has failed? Specifically, is
resort to the doctrine of equivalents precluded in such circumstances,

on the basis that once equivalency has been exhausted in the course of
the literal infringement analysis, it would be merely duplicative to
engage in an equivalency analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents? 150 In this section, I offer a framework that gives a role,
148.
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
149.
Unfortunately, other restrictive statements in Chiuminatta detract from the quoted
passages. See supra Part III.B.
150.
Judge Plager apparently takes this position. See Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky
Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1021-22 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., additional views). Judge
Plager argues that dual notions of equivalency are confusing, and Congress' inclusion of
equivalency in § 112, 6 amounts to a codification of the doctrine of equivalents for means
expressions. Accordingly, "the separate judicially-created doctrine of equivalents would have
no application to those aspects of limitations drawn in means-plus-function form." Id. at 1022.
The framework that I propose incorporates these considerations, but also leaves room for
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albeit a narrow one, to the doctrine of equivalents in the infringement
analysis for means expressions. I also compare the proposed
framework to those discussed in important recent Federal Circuit
decisions, most notably in Chiuminatta, where the court seemed to
recognize that all equivalents are created equivalent, but then
proceeded to the caveat that some equivalents are more equivalent
than others.
A. A Frameworkfor Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents to
Means-Plus-FunctionClauses
If, as I have argued, all equivalents are indeed created
equivalent, the doctrine of equivalents could properly have only a

limited role to play for means expressions.

Where a literal

infringement assertion fails because an accused device includes no
structure that is equivalent to the disclosed structure corresponding to
a means expression, it is difficult to understand what is gained by
allowing a patentee to make a duplicative equivalency assertion under
the doctrine of equivalents. 15 1 Surprisingly, in a number of cases, the
Federal Circuit has proceeded with a duplicative doctrine of

equivalents analysis anyway. 152

This does not mean, however, that all assertions of equivalency
under the doctrine of equivalents that apply to means expressions
patentees to assert the doctrine of equivalents where the accused device performs substantially
the same function as that called out in the means expression and the means expression is
otherwise literally satisfied. See supraPart II.A.
See, e.g., Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311 (questioning why, under such
151.
circumstances, the patentee "should get two bites at the apple").
See, e.g., Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In its
152.
literal infringement analysis, the court employed a,mixture of rhetoric, finding both a lack of
"counterpart equivalent structure" in the accused device, and evidence that the accused and
disclosed circuits "utilize very different structures, for different purposes." Id. at 1477. After
finding no literal infringement, the court proceeded to apply the function-way-result analysis to
determine infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,' referring back to its literal
infringement analysis when it reached the "way" portion of its doctrine of equivalents analysis.
Id. at 1478.
In Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., the court also proceeded with a functionway-result analysis after conducting a literal infringement analysis that found no § 112, 6
equivalency. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222-23 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
There, having characterized the patentee's expert's testimony as being limited to a showing of
equivalency of function, the court proceeded in its doctrine of equivalents analysis to find that
the expert had actually admitted that the "way" of operation was not substantially similar. Id. at
1223.
Even the court's main opinion in Dawn Equipment applies the function-way-result
analysis to assess a doctrine of equivalents allegation concerning a means expression, although
Judge Plager, in his additional views, recognizes the potential problems with the approach. See
Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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should be precluded. In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit hinted that the critical dividing line between literal
infringement and doctrine of equivalents infringement for means
expressions might lie in the analysis of function. 15 3 While a literal
infringement analysis of a means clause requires a determination that
the accused device carries out the identical function recited in the
means clause, the doctrine of equivalents, as traditionally formulated,
is not so constrained, extending instead to accused devices that
perform substantially the same function. Unfortunately, the court
phrased the analysis in the negative:
If the required function is not performed exactly in the accused
device, it must be borne in mind that section 112, paragraph 6,
equivalency is not involved. Section 112, paragraph 6, plays no
role in determining whether an equivalent function is performed by
154
the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Laitram v. Rexnord, the issue of the doctrine's applicability to
means clauses arose again, but the court was even more inscrutable,
averring only that the doctrine "may not be as limited" as equivalency
under § 112, 6.155
The court could clarify matters by stating positively that the
doctrine of equivalents is available to capture accused devices that
use structure that is equivalent to the disclosed structure, and perform
substantially the same function called for in the means expression.
Accordingly, an infringement framework for means expressions
would be expressed along the following lines:
(1). A means expression is literally satisfied where the accused
device performs the identical function called for in the means
expression, using structure that is the same as or equivalent to the
disclosed corresponding structure.
(2). A means expression is satisfied under the doctrine of
equivalents where the accused device performs substantially the same
function called for in the means expression, using structure that is the
same as or equivalent to the disclosed corresponding structure. 156
The Federal Circuit's decision in Unidynamics Corp. v.
Automatic Products International, Ltd.157 is consistent with this
framework for application of the doctrine of equivalents to means
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See Janis, supra note 7, at 211-12 for a similar proposal.
Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int'l, 157 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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expressions. Analyzing the means expression "spring means tending
to keep the door closed," 15 8 the court found that the language in fact
fell under § 112, [ 6, but that the functional recitation ("tending to
keep the door closed") must be read to require the exertion of a
biasing force at all times. 159 The accused device employed either a
magnet or a padded bracket, neither of which performed the identical
"tending" function as defined by the court, precluding a finding of
160
literal infringement.
In considering whether the patentee's infringement assertion
could nonetheless be saved by application of the doctrine of
equivalents, the court focused on substantial similarity of function.
According to the court:
[N]either version of the [accused device] has any structure that
performs substantially the same function of "tending to keep the
door closed." No reasonable jury could find that maintaining the
can loading door in a closed position is substantially the same
function as tending to keep the door closed regardless of the
position it is in. Therefore, neither version... infringes the '750
patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 161
It is to be expected that under this framework, the doctrine of
62 Most
equivalents would rarely be reached for means expressions.'
cases involving means expressions would center around whether the
accused device includes an equivalent to the disclosed corresponding
structure, a component of the literal infringement analysis. Assuming
that the court eliminates restrictive notions of structural equivalency
and replaces them with traditional notions of equivalency, this
framework should provide patentees with a reasonable claim scope
and should overcome the duplication problem identified in Dawn
163
Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms,Inc. and Chiuminatta.

Il at 1314.
158.
159. Id at 1322 ("[When read in light of the written description, 'tending to keep the
door closed' requires a closing action in addition to keeping the door closed once it is in a
closed position.").
Id.
160.
161.
Id. at 1322-23.
162.
On the related point of whether the notion of "equivalent" function is likely to have
much practical impact, see Pretty & Bassett, supranote 120, at 375 (noting that the opportunity
to demonstrate equivalent function remains under the doctrine of equivalents analysis, but
questioning whether fact-finders will be able to differentiate meaningfully between "identical"
and "equivalent" function).
See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
163.
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B. Chiuminatta: Some Equivalents are More Equivalent than
Others?
In Chiuminatta,the Federal Circuit adopted a framework that is
in many ways similar to that which I have outlined above. 164
Importantly, the court recognized the similarities between § 112, 6
equivalents and equivalents under the doctrine, but also refused to
leap to the conclusion that because of these similarities there is no
role for the doctrine of equivalents as it relates to means
expressions.165
However, Chiuminatta adds a wrinkle that may, ironically, lead
courts back towards the application of a rigid structural equivalency
concept for literal infringement.
According to the court in
Chiuminatta, equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents can
encompass future-developed technology - that is, technology
developed after the patent's issue date. The role of the doctrine of
equivalents as applied to means expressions is tied to this quality of
the doctrine, according to the court:
There is an important difference, however, between the doctrine of
equivalents and § 112, [6. The doctrine of equivalents is
necessary because one cannot predict the future. Due to
technological advances, a variant of an invention may be
developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may
constitute so insubstantial a change from what is claimed in the
patent that it should be held to be an infringement. Such a variant,
based on after-developed technology, could not have been
disclosed in the patent. Even if such an element is found not to be
a § 112, 6 equivalent, because it is not equivalent to the structure
disclosed in the patent, this analysis should not foreclose it from
being an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents. 16 6
That is, under the Chiuminatta approach, even though all
equivalents are equivalent, some equivalents seem to be more
equivalent than others. Later-developed equivalents are, effectively,
lesser equivalents; they cannot be captured via a literal infringement
164. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). For commentary on Chiuminatta, see, for example, Lawrence B. Ebert,
Chiuminatta:35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 5 INTELL. PROP. TODAY 32
(July 1998).
165.
The court concludes merely that "a finding of a lack of literal infringement for lack
of equivalent structure under a means-plus-function limitation may preclude a finding of
equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents." Chiuminatta,145 F.3d at 1310.
166.
Id.
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analysis, but might only be captured through application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
Chiuminatta seems to proceed from an important assumption
about the temporal aspect of the infringement inquiry: specifically,
that while the doctrine of equivalents is assessed as of the time of the
infringement,167 literal infringement (including the analysis of
equivalency for §112, 6 literal infringement purposes) must be
measured as of the time of patent issuance, or perhaps even as early
as the application filing date. The broad supposition operating here is
that the literal scope of the claims, once those claims are issued,
remains fixed, justifying (at least in part).
This is a supposition worth questioning. Commentators, and the
Federal Circuit itself, have recognized the possibility that the literal
meaning of a claim term may change over time. 168 Professor Merges
has referred to the possibility of expansion of the "real working
content" of claim phrases, "reflecting the inevitable growth of [the
relevant] technology."' 169 One can well imagine, for example, a claim
drafted in the mid-1980's employing the phrase "computer network."
It seems very likely that the literal meaning of "computer network" in
the mid-1980's differs substantially from the literal meaning of that
phrase today. It may well be incorrect to suppose that the literal
scope of a claim is frozen as of issuance.
Accordingly, Chiuminatta seems to present an unnecessarily
complicated approach to the problem of later-developed technologies.
A simpler approach would favor measuring § 112, 6 equivalents as
of the time of the infringement, just as equivalents under the doctrine
traditionally have been analyzed. 170 Later-developed technology that
167.
See Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
Chiuminattais no longer the only Federal Circuit case to address the temporal aspect § 112 6
decision in AL-Site also clearly proceeds from the same temporal assumption that underlies
Chiuminatta. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., Nos. 97-1593 and 98-1108 (Fed. Cir. March 30,
1999).
168.
See, e.g., John M. Romary & Axie M. Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretationafter
Markman: How the FederalCircuitInterpretsClaims, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1887, 1907-08 (1997)
(offering United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252 (Fed. Cir.
1989), as an illustration of the principle that the meaning of claim terms may change over time).
169.
ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW 699 (2d Ed. 1997) (discussing the "temporal
paradox" between enablement, which is measured as of the application filing date, and
obviousness, which is measured as of the date of invention).
170.
Early Supreme Court cases engendered confusion over whether equivalency under
the doctrine of equivalents should be measured as of the patent application filing date or as of
the time of the infringement. See 3 MARTIN J.ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES
§ 3.4 [2] (1997), comparing Morley Sewing Machine (measuring equivalency as of the time of
the infringement, at least for pioneering inventions) with Halliburton (appearing to endorse the
measurement of equivalency as of the application filing date, at least for "combination"
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is equivalent in the doctrine of equivalents sense would presumably
be equivalent in the § 112, 6 sense. The patentee would be
accorded literal coverage over later-developed technologies, in
keeping with the principle that all equivalents are created equivalent.
Aside from injecting an unnecessary additional layer of
complexity into § 112, 6 analysis, the Chiuminatta rule on the
17 1
doctrine of equivalents has uncomfortable negative implications
for § 112, 6 literal infringement analysis. By arrogating laterdeveloped technology exclusively to the domain of the doctrine of
equivalents, the Chiuminatta rule leaves existing alternative
technologies for analysis under the literal infringement regime. But
Chiuminattaimposes an improper burden on patentees concerning the
disclosure of existing of alternative technologies in the patent
specification.
Specifically, Chiuminatta implies that existing
technology that is not disclosed in the patent specification will fall
outside the reach of § 112, 6 equivalents. 172 This, of course, is
inventions). Today, the Supreme Court has made clear that equivalency for purposes of the
doctrine of equivalents is to be measured as of the time of the infringement. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (announcing the rule without
reference to any supposed distinction between "pioneering" and "combination" inventions).
171.
The potential negative implications of the Chiuminatta rule can perhaps best be
understood by departing from the strict context of functional claiming and considering more
generally what the Supreme Court meant by announcing that equivalency under the doctrine of
equivalents is to be measured as of the time of infringement. Two views might be developed.
On the one hand, it might be assumed that the Court intended to craft an ameliorative rule that
emphasizes that equivalency can extend to developments that would have been unforeseeable as
of the filing date, without meaning necessarily to exclude from equivalency those alternatives
that were known or foreseeable at the time of the filing but were not disclosed. The operative
view here might be that the range of equivalents ordinarily expands over time from the filing
date to the date of infringement. Under this view, the range of equivalency as measured as of
the date of infringement would ordinarily include those equivalents known as of the filing date;
the greater, that is, including the smaller.
On the other hand, as Professor Adelman has pointed out, the rule might spring from
quite a different view, premised on the truism that even the most diligent patent applicant cannot
be expected to disclose unforeseeable future developments in the patent application. Under this
view, measuring equivalency as of the date of infringement is justifiable on the ground that
equivalency offers the diligent patentee recourse to capture unforeseeable future developments.
But under the "diligent patentee" approach, there is arguably no justification for also extending
equivalency to alternatives that were known as of the filing date, because (the argument would
hold) a diligent patentee would have expressly disclosed those alternatives. See ADELMAN ET
AL., supra note 170, at §3.4[l], at 3-42.11 (asserting that "arguably" equivalents that were
known as of the filing date but not disclosed "should not qualify for the doctrine of equivalents
because they must have been excluded by mistake").
As between these two approaches, Chiuminatta seems closer to the latter.
Accordingly, at least in the context of functional clauses, the negative implications of the
Chiuminatta rule for alternatives known as of the filing date must be given careful
consideration.
172.
The court remarked that where, as on the facts of Chiuminatta, the technology
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improper; the purpose of the equivalency language in § 112, [ 6 is to
relieve patentees from having to disclose expressly each and every
known alternative to the disclosed structure that corresponds to the
means expression.
Additionally, the Chiuminatta caveat does not fit well with the
notion that § 112, 6 is a response to Halliburton. In Halliburton,
Justice Black insisted that a means expression should not be
construed to cover later-developed technology:
In this age of technological development there may be many other
devices beyond our present information or indeed our imagination
which will perform that function and yet fit these claims. And
unless frightened from the course of experimentation by broad
functional claims like these, inventive genius may evolve many
more devices to accomplish the same purpose.. .Yet if Walker's
blanket claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now
known or hereafter invented, whether the device be an actual
in a
equivalent of Walker's ingredient or not, could be used
173
combination such as this, during the life of Walker's patent.
If Congress intended to respond to this aspect of Halliburtonby
injecting the equivalency notion into § 112, 6, then it should follow
that later-developed technologies fall within the scope of § 112, 6
equivalents, contrary to the approach espoused in Chiuminatta.
The Chiuminatta caveat for later-developed technologies creates
more problems than it solves, especially insofar as it undermines the
connections between § 112, 6 equivalents and equivalents under the
A simpler framework, in which later-developed
doctrine. 174
technologies would be encompassed within the scope of § 112, 6
equivalents as applied through the literal infringement analysis, would
be preferable.

asserted to be equivalent is known, "it could readily have been disclosed in the patent."
Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311. According to the court, there is no need to proceed with a
doctrine of equivalents analysis where the literal infringement analysis reveals that the patentee
"could have included in the patent what is now alleged to be equivalent, and did not, leading to
a conclusion that an accused device lacks an equivalent to the disclosed structure .. " Id.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
173.
To cite one additional example, I have argued that the traditional equivalency test of
174.
"known interchangeability" could illuminate § 112, 6 equivalency determinations just as it has
done in doctrine of equivalents determinations. Yet under the doctrine of equivalents,
interchangeability extends even where only future, unanticipated technological developments
enabled the interchangeability. See Janis, supra note 7, at 219-20 (citing authorities). Under the
Chiuminatta approach, one would presumably have to develop a special understanding of
interchangeability extending only to that technology known at the time of the application filing.
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V. FUNCTIONAL EXPRE SIONS AND TRADITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
EQUIVALENCY
Two doctrines have traditionally limited assertions of
equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents. The first, prosecution
history estoppel, provides that if a party surrenders subject matter
during patent prosecution in order to avoid the prior art or otherwise
address patentability concerns, the party is precluded from later
asserting a range of equivalents that would effectively recapture the
surrendered subject matter. 175 Prosecution history estoppel has
emerged in post-Warner-JenkinsonCo. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
litigation as a critical limitation on equivalency.
The second limitation is the prior art itself. That is, a patentee
cannot assert a range of equivalents that would cause the claim as a
whole to encompass the prior art, 176 because "a patentee should not
be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which
he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal
claims." 177
While the courts have spoken to these limiting doctrines
frequently in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, they have not
as frequently or as fully elaborated how the regime of limiting
doctrines apply in the context of § 112, 6 equivalents. As detailed
below, the limiting doctrines can apply in the § 112, 6 equivalency
analysis in much the same fashion as they already apply in the
doctrine of equivalents analysis. This should follow as another
consequence of recognizing the linkage between § 112, [6
equivalents and the doctrine of equivalents.

175.
"Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining in an infringement
suit protection for subject matter which it relinquished during prosecution in order to obtain
allowance of the claims." Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1997). See also Hester Indus. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Like the
[reissue] recapture rule, prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from regaining subject
matter surrendered during prosecution in support of patentability."). The Supreme Court has
recently noted that prosecution history estoppel is "a well-established limit on non-literal
infringement." Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 30.
176.
See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766,771 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("[S]ince allowing the claims to encompass [the alleged infringer's] car would cause the
claims to cover subject matter obvious over the prior art, the car cannot be held to infringe the
'876 patent under the doctrine of equivalents."); Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, 14 F.3d 1570, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (referring to "the longstanding principle that the prior art restricts the scope of
equivalency that the party alleging infringement under the doctrine of equivalents can assert").
177.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
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A. ProsecutionHistory
The Federal Circuit has identified two distinct roles for the
prosecution history in infringement analysis, although it can be
difficult to distinguish between the two. First, the prosecution history
can be consulted in the course of claim construction, on the theory
that statements in the prosecution history may provide additional
evidence as to the legally correct meaning of claim terms. 178 This
general principle unquestionably can be brought to bear in the context
of means-plus-function expressions. According to the Federal
Circuit, when a court determines the scope of the "function" portion
of a means-plus-function expression, the court is engaging in claim
construction. 179 Likewise, when a court determines which disclosed
structure corresponds to a recited "means," this exercise is embraced
within the general exercise of claim construction. 180 The Federal
Circuit now needs simply 'to make clear that in accordance with
general principles of claim construction, statements from the
prosecution history can be used to illuminate the meaning of the
"function" and of the range of disclosed structure that properly
corresponds to the "means." Strictly speaking, this usage of the
prosecution history would be the application of the prosecution
history as intrinsic evidence of claim meaning, as distinct from
181
prosecution history estoppel.
The second role for the prosecution history is, of course, as a
basis for prosecution history estoppel, a doctrine that limits assertions
of equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents. Prosecution history,
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,980 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
178.
(identifying the claim language, written description portion of the specification, and prosecution
history as claim construction tools). See also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (including the prosecution history among the sources of "intrinsic
evidence" on claim construction).
179.
Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1308; see also Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods.
Int'l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Desper Prods. v. Qsound Lab., Inc., 157 F.3d 1325,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
As the Federal Circuit explained it in Chiuminatta:
180.
IT]he "means" term in a means- plus-function limitation is essentially a generic
reference for the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification.
Accordingly, a determination of corresponding structure is a determination of the
meaning of the "means" term in the claim and is thus also a matter of claim
construction.
Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1308; see also Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206,
1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
181.
See, e.g., McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing the use of the prosecution history as a claim construction tool from prosecution
history estoppel).
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a matter of law, 182 most commonly arises as a result of a patent
applicant's limiting amendments to pending patent claims during the
prosecution of a patent application. 183 The Federal Circuit has

periodically articulated a "reasonable competitor" inquiry for
prosecution history estoppel, asking whether the claim amendments

(or other statements) in the prosecution history would lead a
reasonable competitor to believe that the applicant was surrendering
subject matter. 184
The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. reinforced the existing rule that when a claim amendment
is later alleged to give rise to prosecution history estoppel, the court is
to assess the reasons for the amendment, 185 principally distinguishing
between amendments made for the purposes of avoiding prior art and
amendments made merely to make explicit what was already inherent
in the claim. Additionally, the Court fashioned a new presumption:
when the inventor provided no reasons in the prosecution history for a
claim amendment, the court should presume that the amendment
related to patentability and call on the inventor to rebut the

presumption, if possible, by providing an alternative explanation for
182.
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30 (referring to prosecution history estoppel
as a "legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents"); see also Southwall Techs., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting prosecution history estoppel is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo).
183.
Prosecution history estoppel can also arise as a result of other limiting remarks
appearing in the prosecution history. See, e.g., Haynes Int'l v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Thus, an estoppel can be created even when the claim, which is the
basis for the assertion of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, was not amended
during prosecution."). See also Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, 141 F.3d 1084,
1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998):
The available scope of protection of a patent under the doctrine of equivalents is
not, however, limited solely by prosecution history estoppel ....In addition, a
separate body of case law.., establishes that, through statements made during
prosecution of a patent application, it can become evident that an asserted
equivalent is beyond coverage under the doctrine of equivalents.
In regard to estoppel arising as a result of claim amendments, the Supreme Court's
Warner-Jenkinson opinion misleadingly implies that the PTO examiner ordinarily suggests
specific amendments to the claims during prosecution. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
32 n.6 (referring to the PTO "deciding whether to ask for a change" to the claims); id. at 33
(articulating a presumption "that the PTO had a substantial reason related to patentability for
including the limiting element added by the amendment"). In reality, the FO almost invariably
leaves it to the applicant to propose and justify claim amendments.
184.
See, e.g., Desper Prods., 157 F.3d at 1338 ("In determining the scope of what, if
any, subject matter has been surrendered, the standard is an objective one: what would a
reasonable competitor reading the prosecution history conclude has been surrendered."); Mark I
Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
185.
Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 32-33.
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186

the amendment.
The prosecution history estoppel doctrine can also be brought to
bear on the analysis of functional expressions. If it is accepted that
the § 112, 6 equivalency analysis partakes heavily of traditional
equivalency notions from the doctrine of equivalents, 187 then there is
every reason to apply to § 112, [6 equivalency analysis the
prosecution history estoppel doctrine as it is enunciated in connection
with the doctrine of equivalents. Indeed, given the opportunity, the
Federal Circuit should make this plain.
There are, however, complications that might impede what
would otherwise seem a relatively straightforward pronouncement.

First, before it can decide whether prosecution history estoppel
applies to the § 112, 6 equivalency analysis, it would be useful for
the court to resolve the issue of whether the § 112, 6 equivalency
analysis is law (and thereby at least in part a claim construction
See id. at 33. Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have made clear that the
186.
presumption cannot be invoked when the inventor has supplied reasons for the amendment. For
example, the Federal Circuit adeptly summarized the law in L&L Wings:
When determining whether prosecution history estoppel applies to limit the
doctrine of equivalents, a court must examine the reason why an applicant
amended a claim. If such examination indicates that a patent applicant has made
a substantive change to his claim that clearly responds to an examiner's rejection
of that claim as unpatentable over prior art, prosecution history estoppel applies
to that claim; only the question of the scope of the estoppel remains. No
presumption needs to be applied in such a case because the reason for the
amendment is clear. Warner-Jenkinson did not change this aspect of prosecution
history estoppel. What Warner-Jenkinson did address was the situation in which
the prosecution history fails to disclose a reason for a claim amendment.
Bai v. L& L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The Warner-Jenkinson Court stated that if the inventor is unable to rebut the
presumption, then "prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine [of]
equivalents to that element." Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. at 33. Unfortunately, the Court left
unclear whether it meant to change existing law on the scope of prosecution history estoppel.
The controversy has fractured the Federal Circuit and may require Supreme Court review. See,
e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
contention that Warner-Jenkinson "requires prosecution history estoppel to act as an absolute
bar, and thus to preclude any equivalents to a claim limitation that was added to overcome a
patentability rejection, regardless of what subject matter was surrendered"); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asserting that "the Court did not change
the scope or effect of the estoppel," but rather intended to retain the traditional rule under which
the estoppel only extended in scope to equivalency assertions that attempted to recapture
surrendered subject matter); cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the order declining the suggestion for rehearing en banc)
(arguing that pursuant to the "plain meaning" of the Warner-Jenkinson opinion, "[i]f the [claim
amendment] was made for reasons of patentability or if the reasons are unknown, then
prosecution history estoppel completely bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to
that amended element").
187.
See supraParts III and IV.
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exercise), or fact. The Federal Circuit currently views equivalency
under the doctrine of equivalents as a question of fact. 188 Certainly, it
would be consistent with the general theme of equivalency between
§ 112, 6 equivalents and doctrine of equivalents equivalents to
designate § 112, 6 a question of fact. 189 If the Federal Circuit took
this step, it would be sensible to speak of the application of
prosecution history estoppel to the § 112, 6 equivalency analysis.
A second complication is that existing Federal Circuit case law
on the point addresses the role of prosecution history in § 112, 6
with less precision than one might desire. In Alpex Computer Corp.
v. Nintendo Co., the claim at issue called for first and second "means
for generating a video signal,"1 90 and the disclosed structure
corresponding to the means clauses included a microprocessor, ROM,

188.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) ("[I]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact to be
submitted to the jury in a jury trial with proper instructions, and to be decided by the judge in a
bench trial."). The Supreme Court, however, did not resolve this issue. Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 37-38.
189.
There is pre-Markman authority for the proposition that the § 112, 6 equivalency
inquiry is factual. See P. M. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 975-76 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
However, the Federal Circuit has avoided resolving the question in precedential decisions in the
post-Markman era. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
One non-precedential decision suggests that some judges on the Federal Circuit
apparently are prepared to take the position that the equivalency analysis is for the judge, even if
equivalency involves fact questions. See Ranpack Corp. v. Storopack, Inc., No. 98-1009, 1998
WL 513598, at *I (Fed.Cir. July 15, 1998) (non-precedential) (contending that the § 112, 6
equivalency analysis falls among the judge's claim interpretation responsibilities, even to the
extent that the analysis requires the judge to resolve factual questions).
Even under this view, the eventual comparison of the claims to the accused device
remains in the province of the fact finder. Ranpack, 1998 WL 513598 at *3 ("[A] section 112
paragraph 6 infringement analysis requires first a construction of the claim to include means
disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereto, and then a factual comparison of the
accused device to those equivalents... ").
Judges Mayer and Newman, concurring in Cybor, are inclined to draw the line
differently yet. Apparently this view would hold that the duty to determine the scope of § 112,
6 equivalents rests with the judge as part of the claim construction analysis, but that the court
must resort to the fact finder where underlying factual questions arise. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, J.,concurring). This mode of
analysis may not accomplish very much in clarifying the real world allocation of
decisionmaking responsibility given that, as the judges acknowledge, "the resolution of this
factual determination is often made at the same time the fact finder determines infringement."
Il
190.
The claims at issue were directed to a video game apparatus, and the relevant meansplus-function clauses included "first means for generating a video signal representing a linear
player image device aligned in a first direction," and "second means for generating a video
signal representing a ball image device...." Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d
1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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and RAM. 19 1 During the prosecution, the applicant distinguished
RAM-based systems of the type disclosed in the specification from
192
prior art systems employing shift registers.
The Federal Circuit seized on these statements as having
significant ramifications for the determination of claim scope, but it

was not clear whether or not the court was really applying prosecution
history estoppel.

On the one hand, the court seemed to couch its

analysis in terms of the principles of claim construction:
Statements made during the prosecution relating to structures
disclosed in the specification are certainly relevant to determining
the meaning of the means-plus-function limitations of the claims at
93
issue.1
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit analogized its use of the

prosecution history to prosecution history estoppel: "U]ust as
prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an equivalence
argument under the doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before the
PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim construction under
§ 112, 6."194 Moreover, it is difficult to discern any meaningful
difference between the court's analysis and the application of
prosecution history estoppel. This is reinforced by the court's
doctrine of equivalents analysis, which appears largely to duplicate its
literal infringement analysis regarding the role of the prosecution
history. 19 5

191.
Il (describing a series of components depicted in Fig. 2 of the specification).
192.
The applicant's comments were made in connection with a prior art rejection of
application claim 1, but the Federal Circuit insisted that the comments applied with equal force
to the construction of the claims ultimately at issue in the litigation. Id. at 1220 ("[We discern
no reason why prosecution history relating to the structure of the video display in the
means-plus-function limitations of claim 1 is not pertinent to the same structure of the same
display system in the means-plus-function limitations of claims 12 and 13.").
193.
Id.A recent case which purports to follow Alpex in this regard is Desper Products.
Although the court in Desper Products cited Alpex for the proposition that the prosecution
history is relevant to determining the scope of a means expression, the court was probably
confronted with merely a generic claim construction issue. One of the claims at issue, which
recited "first and second channel means" also included a modifying expression "said first and
second channels being maintained separate and apart prior to being fed to the two transducers."
Desper Prods. v. Qsound Lab., Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reproducing the
language of claim 7 of the '462 patent). In a dispute over the meaning of "prior to," the court
placed weight on the applicant's remarks during the prosecution concerning similar language
appearing in another claim. Id. at 1339. Because it is not clear that the clause containing the
"prior to" language even needed to be treated as part of the channel means expression.
Accordingly, the court could simply have relied upon the general principle that statements in the
prosecution history are relevant to determining the meaning of claim terms.
194. Alpex, 102 F.3d at 1221.
The court summarized its analysis as follows: "[a]s discussed above, Alpex
195.
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The Federal Circuit repeated this pattern in Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc. There, the court reviewed a doctrine of
equivalents determination on claims that included means plus
function limitation. 196 In setting forth the general proposition that
statements in the prosecution history could affect the scope of a
means-plus-function expression, the court seemed to be invoking a
rule of claim construction: "[p]rosecution history is relevant to the
construction of a claim written in means-plus-function form ....
Clear assertions made in support of patentability thus may affect the
range of equivalents under § 112, 6." 19 7 Yet in the same breath, the
court recited the prosecution history estoppel test as "the relevant
inquiry": "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether a competitor would
reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant
subject matter." 19 8 Perhaps it was not surprising, then, that the court
concluded that the same analysis that it had used in considering the
effect of the prosecution history on the meaning of the claim terms for
literal infringement applied to the analysis of the preclusive effect of
prosecution history estoppel on the doctrine of equivalents allegation:
[Cybor's] arguments are unpersuasive for the same reasons that we
rejected them under our § 112, 6 claim construction and literal
infringement analysis. The inventor's statements to the PTO
regarding the Storkebaum reference, given the marked differences
between the reference and the patented and accused devices, do not
show the deliberate, unequivocal surrender of all external
reservoirs. Because Cybor's pump and reservoir with connecting
tubing do not fall within the range of subject matter relinquished,
prosecution history does not preclude infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. -Accordingly, the district court's denial of
Cybor's motion for JMOL with respect to infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents was not error. 199
In the end, it may be that relatively little other than doctrinal
purity is at stake here, because it appears that courts are indeed
considering prosecution history statements and using them as a basis
for generating an estoppel against assertions of § 112,
6
described its claims during the prosecution of the '555 patent as covering random access
systems capable of changing a single bit. It did not and could not claim image generation by
shift registers." Id. at 1223.
196. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reciting the
clause at issue from claim 1, "second pumping means in fluid communication with said first
pumping means").
197.
Id. at 1457.
198.
Id.
199.
Id at 1460.
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equivalency, even where they seem to be employing the rhetoric of
claim construction. Nevertheless, the court might forestall potential
confusion by owning up to its use of the estoppel doctrine in § 112,
200
6 equivalency determinations.
B. PriorArt
The prior art, as previously noted, limits the reach of the doctrine
of equivalents by precluding assertions of equivalency that would
cause the claim as a whole to read on the prior art. Judge Rich's
opinion in Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Associates20 1
stands as perhaps the most powerful enunciation of the principle:
[It may be helpful to conceptualize the limitation on the scope of
equivalents by visualizing a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in
scope to literally cover the accused product. The pertinent
question then becomes whether that hypothetical claim could have
been allowed by the PTO over the prior art. If not, then it would
be improper to permit the patentee to obtain that coverage in an
infringement suit under the doctrine of equivalents. If the
hypothetical claim could have been allowed, then priorart is not a
bar to the infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.202
Whether or not the inquiry is stated in terms of the hypothetical
claim analysis, 203 it is critical that the inquiry seek to determine
200.
Judges Mayer and Newman, in contrast, apparently see an analytical difference
between the application of the prosecution history to limit § 112, 6 equivalency and its
application to limit equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents. As the judges put it in their
Cybor concurring opinion:
Just as the fact finder's infringement analysis differs between equivalence under
paragraph 112(6) and the doctrine of equivalents, so too differs the analytical
effect of statements made during the prosecution of the patent on construction of
the claims. Under paragraph 112(6), a statement made during prosecution may
confine the range of equivalent structures, materials, or acts that are directly
claimed by the patent. However, in the context of a doctrine of equivalents
analysis, the patentee seeks protection beyond that claimed by the patent
directly. As such, the judge's construction of the claims-which includes the
interpretation of claim terms-may not be sufficient to remove from the jury's
consideration all subject matter that was disclaimed during prosecution.
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1467-68. Plainly, this view is founded on the questionable notion,
developed in Valmont, that § 112, 6 equivalents and equivalents under the doctrine of
equivalents differ substantially in origin and purpose. It is difficult to identify any persuasive
reason for drawing distinctions between the role of the prosecution history in the two analyses if
it is accepted that the two varieties of equivalency in fact do not differ dramatically one from the
other.
201.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
202.
Id. at 684.
The hypothetical claim analysis advanced in that opinion has not won uniform
203.
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whether the claim as a whole encompasses the prior art. Whether or
not a claim limitation encompasses the prior art is, of course, of no
moment; components of claimed inventions are often old.
Accordingly, while the prior art precludes assertions of equivalency
that would cause the claim to be indistinguishable from the prior art,
assertions of equivalency that merely would cause a claim limitation
to read on the prior art are not necessarily precluded.
The Federal Circuit has recognized as much in the context of the
doctrine of equivalents. For example, in Coming Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Electric, USA, Inc., the alleged infringer invoked the prior
art as a limitation on the patentee's equivalency assertion. 204 As the
Federal Circuit saw it, the alleged infringer's argument demonstrated
only that the equivalency assertion cause a limitation of the claim to
encompass the prior art. Rejecting the defense, the court observed
that "[n]othing is taken from the 'public domain' when the issue of
equivalency is directed to a limitation only, in contrast to the entirety
205
of the claimed invention."
The Federal Circuit spoke again to the question in Conroy v.
Reebok International. The Federal Circuit observed that the District
Court had attempted to apply Wilson Sporting Goods v. David
Geoffrey & Associates but had not conducted a hypothetical claim
analysis:
In this case, rather than perform a hypothetical claim analysis, the
district court directly compared the prior art with a single
element.., of the accused device in an attempt to determine the
extent to which prior art limits the application of the doctrine of
equivalents... 206
The Federal Circuit emphasized that while the hypothetical
claim analysis was not mandatory, the District Court's alternative
analysis in this case led to error:
In purporting to follow Wilson, however, the district court here
concluded that the mere existence of an element in the prior art
adherence, and the Federal Circuit has tended not to view it as a compulsory form of analysis.
See, e.g., International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("Hypothetical claim analysis is an optional way of evaluating whether prior art limits the
application of the doctrine of equivalents."). See also Henrik D. Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents
Analysis after Wilson Sporting Goods: The Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 262
(1990) (criticizing the hypothetical claim analysis on various grounds).
204.
Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
205.
Id.
206.
Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, 14 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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automatically precludes Mr. Conroy from asserting a scope of
equivalency sufficient to encompass the corresponding element in
the accused device. In so doing, the district court applied an
improper test of permissible patent scope under the doctrine of
equivalents, and thus contravened the rationale of Wilson [citations
omitted]. The district court's application of an improper scope
test, when directly comparing the [prior art] patent with the
accused Reebok tabs, results in an overbroad restriction by the
prior art on the application of the doctrine of equivalents by Mr.
Conroy. 2 07
An appropriate analysis would have considered whether the
equivalency analysis caused the claim as a whole to encompass the
prior art, applying familiar patentability standards:
While a court may employ a means other than the hypothetical
claim analysis set forth in Wilson to determine the extent to which
the prior art limits the application of the doctrine of equivalents, a
court also must apply standards of patentability consistent with our
jurisprudence regarding anticipation and obviousness. 208
The same hierarchy should, it would seem, apply to § 112, 6
equivalency. That is, if an assertion of equivalency in a literal
infringement analysis concerning a means expression caused the
claim as a whole to read on the prior art (as analyzed by a
hypothetical claim analysis or other appropriate analysis), the
assertion of equivalency should be precluded. However, an assertion
of equivalency that merely causes the means expression to read on the
prior art should not necessarily be precluded; the court must ask
whether the claim as a whole is rendered unpatentable.
The Federal Circuit seems to have spoken to one half of this
hierarchy without speaking to the other, creating the potential for
confusion. In Intel v. InternationalTrade Commission,20 9 the Federal
Circuit declared flatly that "[i]t is not necessary to consider the prior
art in applying section 112, paragraph 6. Even if the prior art
discloses the same or an equivalent structure, the claim will not be
limited in scope thereby." 2 10 The court has twice reaffirmed this
proposition.2 11 The Intel v. InternationalTrade Commission court
Id. at 1577.
207.
208. Id
209.
Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 842.
210.
See Applied Med. Resources Corp. v. United States Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374,
211.
1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating court did not err in excluding certain testimony about the
purported limiting effect of certain prior art references on the scope of § 112, 6 equivalents,
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offered two undifferentiated justifications for its rule: first, a
reiteration of suspect comments about supposed differences between
the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6 equivalents; 2 12 and, second,
the principle that "[c]laim limitations may, and often do, read on the
prior art, particularly in combination patents. ' '2 13
The first justification is inadequate, for reasons that I have
developed throughout this article, and the second justification does
not support the flat proscription against any consideration of prior art
in connection with a § 112, 6 analysis. If an assertion of § 112, 6
equivalency would cause a claim as a whole to read upon the prior
art, the assertion should be precluded as an extension of the general
rule limiting the assertion of equivalency under the doctrine of
equivalents. This approach would dovetail with the court's current
approach to the use of the prosecution history in connection with
§ 112, 6 equivalency assertions. The court should refine its rule
enunciated in Intel v. InternationalTrade Commission accordingly.
VI. LIFE WrHouT § 112,

6

As set forth in the preceding sections, three main case law
reforms flow from a careful reassessment of § 112, 6 jurisprudence:
a literal infringement analysis employing traditional indicia of
equivalency (rather than the structural equivalency rubric); a narrow
role for the doctrine of equivalents confined to equivalency of
function; and recognition of the applicability of traditional limitations
on the doctrine of equivalents (prosecution history estoppel and prior
art) in their current incarnations. Taken together, these reforms could
lead to a more coherent framework for approaching § 112, 6
clauses.
Still, the framework seems inevitably complex, even inelegant.
This should trouble patent policymakers more than it has to date.
That the § 112, 6 equivalency jurisprudence seems inevitably so
awkward may hint at structural problems that may call for legislative
action.2 14 Indeed, at least two crucial structural problems can be
because Intel establishes that the prior art is not a limitation); Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d
1541, 1547 n. 7 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating district court correctly excluded prior art evidence in
the course of construing means-plus-function limitation).
212.
See Intel, 946 F.2d at 842.
213.
Id.
214.
See, e.g., Hofmann & Heller, supra note 45, at 290 (concluding that legislative action
is warranted). For an alternative view advocating case law reform based around the "as a
whole" notion of equivalency, see Deron Burton, Bringing Theory into Practice: Predictable
Scope for Functional Patent Claims, 42 UCLA L. REV. 221, 258-261 (1994) (suggesting that
the doctrine of equivalents analysis for claims containing means limitations proceed on a
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identified, both of which deserve further exploration.
First, § 112, [ 6's disclosure-plus-equivalents clause may simply
be an anachronism. As previously discussed, a careful historical
synthesis demonstrates that the disclosure-plus-equivalents scheme of
§ 112, 6 has links to the doctrine of equivalents as it was understood
in the central claiming regime. 215 As Professor Takenaka has pointed
out, it may make little sense to cling to an artifact of the central
claiming regime when modem claim construction analysis in the
United States has turned to a peripheral claiming regime. 2 16 On this
basis alone, one might conclude that § 112, 6's disclosure-plusequivalents regime cannot possibly afford a satisfactory solution to
the functional claiming problem today.
This argument speaks to the awkwardness of the solution
embodied in § 112, 6. But what of the problem? Considering as a
whole the history of the functional claiming doctrine, and the modem
application of § 112, 6, what problem does § 112, 6 seek to solve?
Courts have expended enormous effort to attempt to shoehorn § 112,
6 equivalency into the modem infringement framework, but rarely,
if ever, have paused to consider the problem that § 112, 6 is
intended to solve. Perhaps, indeed, this is a legislative question. In
the answer to this question lies another, more serious potential
objection to § 112, 6 as it is currently formulated: the problem that
§ 112, [6 was designed to solve - the "functional claiming
problem," - may not be a very compelling problem at all when
subjected to a broad reevaluation using modem sensibilities.
This reevaluation can be pursued by considering what would
"claim-as-a-whole" basis to preserve a distinction between equivalents under the doctrine and
§ 112, 6 equivalents). This latter proposal may take limited support fromearly Federal Circuit
law, but seems untenable today given the Supreme Court's unequivocal adoption of the
element-by-element approach to equivalency under the doctrine of equivalents in WarnerJenkinson. See Warer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
Professor Adelman has espoused yet a different alternative. Professor Adelman
would eliminate the structure-plus-equivalents rule, but retain the possibility of limiting a
functional clause through application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents:
The proper approach is to treat a functional element as meaning what it says for
literal infringement...Then, the court should apply the reverse doctrine of
equivalents where the element upon which the functional element is read is so
different from that of the disclosed element, that a court should not find
infringement.
ADELMAN Er AL., supra note 170, at § 3.2[2]. See also Martin J. Adelman & Gary L.
Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not
Ansiver, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673,720-26 (1989).
215.
See supra Part ll.C.
216.
See TAKENAKA, supranote 70, at 2. Professor Takenaka intends to elaborate on this
thesis in a forthcoming article.
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follow if Congress eliminated the § 112, [6 disclosure-plusequivalents provision from the statute. 217 What would be the
modem-day objections to unrestricted functional claiming, and are
those objections serious enough to justify imposing a restrictive

interpretation?
A. Who's Afraid? Probingthe FunctionalClaimingAnxiety
Closet

This section considers two potential objections to unrestricted
functional claiming, drawing upon the historical synthesis presented
in Part II.
First, unrestricted functional -expressions would
presumably be objected to as conferring unduly broad claim scope on
patentees. As detailed below, many (perhaps all) of the functional
claiming cases sound this theme. However, the fear that functional
claims are unduly broad is ill-considered and does not justify the
§ 112, 6 restriction.

Second, unrestricted functional expressions might draw fire
under invalidity/ineligibility theories, particularly indefiniteness.
Certainly, there seems to be some historical resonance to this
argument, but, as set out below, it likewise fails to justify the existing
restrictions § 112, 6.
1. Exaggerated Fears of Overbreadth

The proposition that a means-plus-function clause is too broad
when it encompasses all means for performing the stated function
may seem, at first blush, intuitive, and courts appear to have followed
217.
Others have proposed such a statutory revision. For example, the Intellectual
Property Section of the ABA proposed a resolution on the subject in May 1998. The proposed
language would excise the restrictive language from § 112, 6 and explicitly extend means
expressions to all means for accomplishing the stated function, unless the patentee indicates
otherwise:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, materials or acts
in support thereof; and such element shall be construed to cover all means or
steps for performing the specified function in cooperation with the other elements
of the combination, except to the extent the claim expressly includes, or is
expressly limited to, certain means.
Proposed Resolution 108-Cl (May, 1998), reprinted in Chair's Bulletin, ABA Section of
Intellectual Property Law, May 1998, at 4.
It is also worth noting that most foreign patent systems seem to handle functional
claims quite adequately without any restrictive provisions analogous to § 112, 6. See, e.g.,
ADELMAN, ETAL., supra note 170, § 2.9[5], at 2-1176.17 (collecting European authorities). See
also John Richards, Functional Claiming in Europe and the Commonwealth, Address at the
Finnegan Lectures, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1998) (copy on file with author).

19993 FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS - § 112,

6 JURISPRUDENCE 293

this intuition in a number of cases prior to the enactment of § 112, 6.
Yet it is not especially easy to tease out the overbreadth theory from
the pre-1952 case law. While some commentary explicitly relied on
the undue breadth theory,2 18 most cases on the subject do purport to
apply rules of claim construction or invalidity/ineligibility, as
previously detailed.
Halliburton itself is emblematic.
The
Halliburton Court declared that it was addressing the question of
whether the invention was "adequately described" under the thengoverning provision,2 19 and held that it was not. 220
While
conventionally portrayed as an indefiniteness rationale, the Court's
decision was in fact nothing of the kind. Had the claim been
indefinite, one probable indicia would have been the extreme
difficulty of identifying structure in the specification that
corresponded to the functional expression. Yet it was clear from the
case that the Court knew exactly the structure that corresponded to the

functional expression at issue. 221 The Court was concerned about
218.
For example, one early commentator acknowledged the overbreadth objection to
means expressions and even attempted to formulate guidelines for the application of this
concept. H. Hurvitz, Functionality of Patent Claims, 21 J .PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 851, 854-55
(1939). Similarly, at least one treatise writer reinforced the concern as to the overbreadth, in the
abstract, of means expressions. See, e.g., DELLER, supra note 1, at § 232, at 663-64:
A functional claim is one which covers all means of arriving at the desired result,
although the machine by which such result is obtained may be wholly different
from that shown in the patent. It is capable, therefore, of reading on independent
subsequent inventions of others. Accordingly, it is objectionable as being too
broad.
(emphasis in original).
219.
The provision was R.S. 4888, which contained both the indefiniteness of claims
provision now contained in § 112, 2 and the adequacy of disclosure provisions now appearing
in § 112, 1. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ("We must,
however, determine whether, as petitioner charges, the claims here held valid run afoul of
Rev.Stat. § 4888 because they do not describe the invention but use 'conveniently functional
language at the exact point of novelty'...
220.
Id. at 13.
221.
The functional expression at issue was "means associated with said pressure
responsive device for tuning said receiving means to the frequency of the echoes from the
tubing collars of said tubing sections to clearly distinguish the echoes from said couplings from
each other." Id. at 9 n.7. As the Court plainly understood, the specification described the
corresponding structure as a mechanical acoustical resonator:
The device added [to make echo waves more prominent] was a mechanical
acoustical resonator .... Walker's testimony was, and his specifications state,
that by making the length of this tubal resonator one-third the length of the
tubing joints, the resonator would serve as a tuner ....
His specifications and
drawings also show the physical structure of a complete apparatus, designed to
inject pressure impulses into a well, and to receive, note, record and time the
impulse waves.
Id. at7.
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undue breadth, 222 not about indefiniteness.
A number of commentators at the time of the Halliburton
decision questioned whether the indefiniteness rationale was in fact
an overbreadth theory. 223 Some modem commentators have likewise
recognized that the Halliburton decision is really about claim
224
overbreadth, not indefiniteness.
The Halliburton Court's improper intermingling
of
indefiniteness and undue breadth was by no means new. Indeed, long
prior to Halliburton,commentators recognized the danger of abuse of
the indefiniteness theory in connection with functional expressions.
As one commentator pointed out more than two decades prior to the
Court's Halliburtondecision:
The functional claim is almost always first refused as "indefinite."
But in the same breath.. .almost invariably the statement follows
that the claim is indefinite because it "covers all solutions of the
problem." With all due reverence for precedent, it is submitted
that there is in such an interpretation a clear contradiction in terms.
A claim which covers everything is not indefinite....
[A] claim which definitely covers all solutions of the problem is no
more indefinite than a claim which covers fewer solutions, or
which covers only one solution. The difference is only in the
breadth. 225
Other sources likewise note a propensity for courts to confuse
the indefiniteness and undue breadth theories. 226
222.
At one point the Court even seemed to agree. See id. at 12 ("Under these
circumstances the broadness, ambiguity, and overhanging threat of the functional claim of
Walker become apparent.").
223.
See, e.g., Crews, supra note 23, at 183 (questioning the Court's indefiniteness
conclusion on the basis that "it would appear that no person practicing in the art could have very
serious doubt as to whether a proposed apparatus included a tuned acoustical means as covered
in the claim"); Zalkind, supra note 23, at 128 (arguing that the Halliburtoncourt appears to
blend indefiniteness and overbreadth concerns); Conn, supra note 23, at 292-97 (arguing
generally that while the HalliburtonCourt couched its analysis in terms of precluding functional
claims, the Court was actually concerned about claim breadth).
224.
See Hofmann & Heller, supra note 45, at 271; Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent
Coverage: Defining Scope of anInvention by Function, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 165 (1994).
225.
Arthur W. Cowles, A Suggested Treatment of "Functional" Claims Part 1, 6 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 293, 300-01 (1924). Cowles proceeded to criticize courts for confusing the proper
inquiry as to definiteness in the language of a claim with an improper analysis as to definiteness
in the scope of a claim. Arthur W. Cowles, A Suggested Treatment of "Functional" Claims
Part1, 61. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 315, 324 (1924).
226.
See, e.g., DELLER, supra note 1, at § 282 (collecting authorities for the proposition
that the indefiniteness and undue breadth theories, while often confused, are distinct).
Ironically, the Deller treatise itself may exhibit the same confusion. See supranote 218 (noting
that the Deller treatise applies an "undue breadth" rationale for the functional claiming
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The observation that fear of undue breadth lies at the root of
functional claiming doctrine may be critical to efforts to reform
§ 112, [6. If, indeed, the § 112, 6 restriction is predominantly an
attempt to address a perceived overbreadth problem, then it is easily
assailable as both conceptually inconsistent with existing statutory
solutions and cumulative of them. As is well established, the highly
subjective, ungainly notion of undue breadth in the abstract has no
place in modem U.S. patent law. 227 Instead, U.S. patent law currently
regulates claim breadth with comparison to the breadth of the
disclosure, using the requirements of § 112, 1,228 particularly the
2 30
enablement requirement 2 29 and the written description requirement,
which feature objective standards.
An example demonstrating that notions of undue breadth are
entirely subsumed today under the enablement requirement is In re
Vaeck. 23 1 There, the claimed invention concerned a genetic
engineering product which used "Cyanobacteria cells" (blue-green
algae) as a host for producing insecticidally active Bacillus
proteins. 2 32 The examiner believed that the recited cyanobacteria
were a diverse group of organisms whose molecular biology had not
been well delineated, and the applicant's disclosure referred
233
specifically only to a small number of strains of cyanobacteria.
Had the case arisen prior to the Federal Circuit era, it is entirely
conceivable that the issue would have been framed in the rhetoric of
doctrine). See also In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (eschewing the "undue
breadth" terminology and instead explaining the differences between indefiniteness and
adequacy of disclosure theories such as enablement).
See, e.g., In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (referring to the
227.
"impropriety of 'undue breadth' rejections"). Compare In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (applying an undue breadth rationale).
See In re Hyatt 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (criticizing the notion of undue
228.
breadth and observing that what was formerly known as "undue breadth" now is addressed by
the adequacy of description requirements housed in § 112, 1).
35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 provides, in relevant part:
229.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make
and use the same ....
Id. ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention .....
230.
The Federal Circuit's recent pronouncements suggest that the "written description" requirement
may play an increasingly prominent role in regulating claim scope. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery,
Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (observing that a narrow disclosure limits
claim breadth under application of the written description requirement).
In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488,493 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
231.
Id at 490 (presenting the text of claim 1).
232.
See id at 492-93.
233.
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"undue breadth." 234 Instead, the Federal Circuit's analysis of the

claim scope issue was founded purely on the enablement
requirement.

235

Plainly, functional claims which read broadly could be tested,
like claims in other formats, for compliance with the enablement and
written description requirements, without any need to impose the

restrictive construction set forth in § 112, [6. Just as a careful
analysis of the roots of § 112,

6 equivalency shows that the

restrictive construction is anachronistic as a solution to the functional
claiming problem, a careful analysis likewise shows that the problem
itself, framed as a fear of undue breadth, is similarly anachronistic.
2. Vague Apprehensions of Indefiniteness
The indefiniteness rationale for the restrictive construction of

functional expressions may still raise concerns. Conventional views
would presumably hold that even when disentangled from the notion
of undue breadth, indefiniteness would remain an objection to
unbridled functional claiming. Certainly, the rationale would have
some historical resonance if it were possible to identify cases that
genuinely applied an indefiniteness rationale rather than an undue
breadth rationale. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has referred, though
somewhat offhandedly, to the § 112, 6 restrictions as forestalling an
indefiniteness objection to functional expressions. 2 36 Indefiniteness
concerns may also lie behind the Federal Circuit's recent insistence
that the structure corresponding to a means-plus-function expression
be "clearly linked" to the means-plus-function expression. 2 37
234.
Indeed, the examiner cited a portion of the "undue breadth" entry in the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure § 706.03(z). See id. at 492.
235.
In re Vaeck, 947 F. 2d at 495-96.
236.
See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that § 112, 1 6 may save functional expressions from probable indefiniteness).
237.
For example, the Federal Circuit has declared that:
A structure disclosed in the specification is only deemed to be 'corresponding
structure' if the specification clearly links or associates that structure to the
function recited in the claim. The duty to link or associate structure in the
specification with the function is the quid pro quo for the convenience of
employing § 112, para. 6.
Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). See
also Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
For an interesting case on the interaction of § 112, 1; § 112, 2; and § 112, 6 as
currently formulated, see In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Personalized
Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 706 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (reversing a lower court determination that a means clause was indefinite but reminding
the court that the claim should also be analyzed for compliance with the enablement
requirement).

1999] FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS-

§ 112, 6 JURISPRUDENCE 297

The prospect of indefinite claims is not a convincing rationale
for retaining § 112, 6 in its current form. The patent statute, § 112,
2, already provides a baseline requirement that claims avoid
Accordingly, even if unbridled functional
indefiniteness. 2 38
expressions are peculiarly susceptible to indefiniteness problems, the
patent law provides a remedy. Indeed, even though § 112, 2
indefiniteness does not seem to play a particularly robust role in
modem patent litigation, it is potentially a more potent weapon in the
current peripheral claiming regime than it was in the central claiming
regime. Whereas courts were more free in the central claiming
regime to "interpret" additional elements into a claim to avoid
potential indefiniteness problems, modem courts facing genuine cases
of indefiniteness must invalidate the claims. If unbridled means
expressions are, in fact, inherently subject to indefiniteness problems,
courts will presumably begin to invalidate them and patent applicants
will presumably begin using them more sparingly.
To be sure, § 112, [2 indefiniteness has been an
underdeveloped, and perhaps even clumsy, doctrine. But Federal
Circuit case law already shows how § 112, 2 could be fine tuned for
unrestricted functional expressions. The cases mentioned above,
which impose a "duty to link" disclosed structure to means
expressions for purposes of applying § 112, 6, could readily be
generalized. That is, a court could certainly expect that under the
general requirements of claim definiteness (as set out in § 112, 2)
and adequate disclosure (as set out in § 112, 1), the elements of a
patentee's claims can reasonably be linked to corresponding
disclosure in the specification, irrespective of the form of the claims.
The "duty to link" is a useful rubric and courts could continue to
apply it in the post-§ 112, 6 world.
B. Conclusion
The fear of functional claiming, unfortunately, remains extant. It
is evident in the very intricacy of § 112, 6 jurisprudence, and has
been evident for some time, even prior to the enactment of § 112, 6.
Today, however, in view of the steadily rising incidence of § 112,
[6 equivalency assertions in patent cases, reform has become
238.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention"). The Federal Circuit has supplied an objective standard for evaluating § 112,
2 indefiniteness issues. See, e.g., Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) ("If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the
art of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more.").
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imperative. This Paper has proposed a variety of case law reforms
which could lend a measure of added stability to § 112, [6
jurisprudence in the short term without radically reformulating its
basic structure. In the longer term, however, legislative reform
eliminating the § 112, 6 restriction may prove a far more sensible
alternative.

